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THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE POPULATION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Abstract

While reflecting on this issue, I would like to note the important role of the disintegration of language known as Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian. During the existence of federal Yugoslavian state (from May 1945 to spring 1990), the language "was an instrument of policy, which seeks to create a unified society of internationalist socialist consciousness, rather than ethnic one". Along with the change of the political situation, a common language ceased to exist, and its place has been taken by three separate national languages: Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian. However, in the case of identity issues, the notions of identity and human identification should be clarified as well as terms of bratstva and jedinstva ("brotherhood and unity"). Multidimensional issues of the identity and ethnic individuality of the only Slavic Muslim nation are proving the old thesis that mythical production is determined by the political reality. Patriotic consolidation, known well from Polish history of the twentieth century, is clearly based on the sequence rooted in the archetypes of freedom, equality, paradise lost, in the golden age of story, in which a man wishing to devote his existence to a great cause, sincerely believes. This phenomenon has permeated the Balkans that were facing an armed conflict. In their anachronistic view, the power of the state was determined by the size of its territory. Their fight to broaden the borders of the homeland as much possible, was supported by a solid ideological foundation. Bosnians became the subject of many myths, but, by Serbs and Croats, they were simultaneously regarded as a segment of their nation. Both in Belgrade and Zagreb, a romantic plot to create a mega nation - the great family gathering all potential members, conscious or not of his/hers Serbian or Croatian affiliation - would have to result in further proliferation of arguments proving affiliation of neighboring peoples.

Keywords: Croatia, identity, Bosnia, Serbia, language.

The appearance of the new countries on the map of Europe: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro (which was part of the state of Serbia until 2006), resulted in the creation of new languages, the intensification of the identity processes and, consequently, in the display of the individuality. After many years of an uneasy cooperation and coexistence within the boundaries of one country, when for the existence of the federation, the entities that were a component of the state, were ordered to erase the "inconvenient" from the tradition, it was time for a correction of national history image, writing of a new history of literature and re-reading of many phenomena. It was also time to extract from the oblivion, the authors and historical figures whose biographies made them inconvenient in recent years. Trying to recover the lost tradition, all new interpretations are focusing, without an exception, on the situation of oppression and symbolic violence with which they had to deal for many years¹. It is this aspect of the current functioning of the different cultures that comes to light, and what unites the authors of the 'recovered' history, is the feeling that for many years they were a subject of manipulation. These reinterpretations, were supposed to lead to the consolidation of a new national identities. Since the authors were willing to pass over everything that could indicate a closeness and common characteristics of the different cultures and they were drawing a clear line between civilization (us) and barbarism (them), they condemned themselves for selectivity. The nineties, especially the first half, were a time when the nationalist inclinations were in favor².

While reflecting on this issue, I would like to note the important role of the disintegration of the language known as Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian. During the existence of federal Yugoslavian state (from May 1945 to spring 1990), according to the currently binding terms of *bratstva* and *jedinstva* ("brotherhood and unity"), the language "was an instrument of policy, which seeks to create a unified society of internationalist socialist consciousness, rather than ethnic one". As a result, throughout this period, not only the language was the subject of an artificial and forced integration³. Along with the change of the political situation, a

¹ T. Edensor, *Tożsamość narodowa, kultura popularna i życie codzienne*, Kraków 2004, s. 45-46.

² *Ibidem*, s. 56.

³ B. Oczko, *Zagadnienia sporne w językoznawstwie chorwackim i serbskim po rozpadzie języka serbsko-chorwackiego*, [w] J. Kornhauser (red.), *Przemiany w świadomości i kulturze duchowej narodów Jugosławii po 1991 roku*, Kraków 1999, s. 241.

common language ceased to exist, and its place has been taken by three separate national languages: Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian.

However, in the case of the identity issues, the notion of identity and human identification should be clarified. Antonina Kłosowska, listed the basic components of identification. The place, role and functions of the national identity are among them, as well as the acquisition of the entire national culture in the total human identity⁴. Kłosowska writes about the national identity, but terminologically identity and identification penetrated everyday consciousness. Translation of these words can be found in today's common Polish language dictionaries, and they are authenticated by the opinions and statements of average speakers, who are participants in national and ethnic culture. Polish Language Dictionary defines identity and identification as follows:

Identity:

1. Our identity is an awareness of our features and of our separateness.
2. The identity of a community, is its internal coherence and a sense of unity.

Identification:

1. Identification of a person is the recognition of his/her identity.
2. Identification of individuals with a group, is an identification with the culture, beliefs, values of that group⁵.

As these definitions indicate, the boundary between the concepts of national and ethnic identity is very difficult to determine. In fact, it depends on how we call a group that is a reference point for an identity/ identification. In the case of the national group we can call it national identity, and in the case of an ethnic group - ethnic identity. It is also important to determine the basic parameters of cultural identity. The language is one of the indicators. Dependence of language and identity is bilateral. Researchers who study the identity issues (sociologists, anthropologists, ethnologists, linguists), argue, that the language is one of the key factors that determine the human identity, although it's not simple and unambiguous relationship⁶. There are countries that are multilingual (Switzerland, Canada), there are also languages that are official in several countries (e.g., English in Britain, the United States of America, Canada, or Australia). This case, however, refers to the state nations, and for them language is not a constitutive factor of identity.

⁴ A. Kłosowska, *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Kraków 2005, s. 104.

⁵ www.sjp.pwn.pl. Marzec 2013.

⁶ A. Kłosowska, *Kultury narodowe...*, s. 132-133.

Issues of the identity and ethnic individuality of the only Slavic Muslim nation, are multi-dimensional, proving the old thesis that mythical production is determined by the political reality. Patriotic consolidation, known well from Polish history of the twentieth century, is clearly based on the sequence rooted in the archetypes of freedom, equality, paradise lost, in the golden age of story, in which a man wishing to devote his existence to a great cause, sincerely believes⁷. This phenomenon has permeated the Balkans that were facing an armed conflict. In their anachronistic view, the power of the state was determined by the size of its territory. Their fight to broaden the borders of the homeland as much as possible, was supported by a solid ideological foundation. Bosnians became the subject of many myths, but, by Serbs and Croats, they were simultaneously regarded as a segment of their nation. Both in Belgrade and Zagreb, a romantic plot to create a mega nation - the great family gathering all potential members, conscious or not of his/hers Serbian or Croatian affiliation - would have to result in further proliferation of arguments proving affiliation of neighboring peoples⁸. Both sides published materials that were meant to prove that in the pre-Romanesque period, Bosnia was fundamentally Serbian or Croatian, and these, legally and internationally unfounded historical views, were presented as irrefutable. The ritualization was used primarily to mobilize the community in case of possible military effort. In response to the view of the history presented by Serbs and Croats, Bosnians developed their own vision of the past, demonstrating not only the distinction of ethos, but also showing that they had populated the area before Catholic and Orthodox population arrived. Each of the three versions of history: Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian are marked by structural distortions and myths.

While searching for a national identity, Croatian thinkers, sometimes change history. It would be incorrect to assume that non-Croatian researchers, including Dr. Samara Abbas from India, are also biased. According to him, the Croats (Hrvati) come from Iran⁹. Croatian flag – checkerboard – is a Persian invention, and the traditional clothes of both sexes have a lot in common with the Iranian ones. The Swedish geneticists have confirmed that 75% of Croats are probably of Iranian origin. Currently, the areas in Asia from which Croats originated, are populated by Jat people, so Abbas postulates their kinship with the Balkan Slavs. Professor

⁷ J. Campbell, *Potęga mitu*, Kraków 2007, s. 35.

⁸ A. Gliza, *Narodowe i polityczne dążenia Chorwatów w XIX i na początku XX wieku*, Szczecin 2001, s.108-109.

⁹ F. Ziejka, *Współcześni Słowianie wobec własnych tradycji i mitów*, Kraków 2001, s. 67-69.

Mandic argues that "(...) *the historical evidence suggests that social organization, religion, customs, and art of the ancient Croats have the Iranian source (...)*". Historically, the Croats are divided into White, Red and Green. If we follow the Persian coloring of the parts of the world: black is the north (Black Sea north of Iran), white is the west (for example, in the name of Belarus), red means south (Red Sea), and the green is the east¹⁰. Organization of the Croatian states, as well as the vocabulary associated with the leadership (King, etc.), are all Iranian. However, prof. Dobrovich believes that the Croats separated from Caucasian Iranians at the time of Roman Empire. Caucasian Antes were another part of that group. On the other hand, according to Professor Zdravko Mandic, "(...) *the ancient Croats arrived in the river Don area from Iran. The inscription on the stone of King Darius (522-486 BC) mentions their name "Haruavat-is" among the 23 subject nations. Persian scriptures Avesti (Vendidad) call that nation Harahvaiti. The areas inhabited by them, included the southern half of today's southern Afghanistan, Balochistan and the eastern part of today's Iran (...)*"¹¹.

The name of the capital of Zagreb is derived from the Zagros Mountains, that are located in southwestern Iran. Dinara mountains in Dalmatia and the Croatian currency - dinar might be named after the Mount Dinar (Dene) in Iran. The Croats migration route from Asia to the Balkans, led from Harahvaiti and Harauvati in Iran and Afghanistan, through Hurravat and Hurrvuhe in Armenia and Georgia, and Horouathos by the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Some researchers postulate migration through today's Turkey, others through areas north of the Black Sea, connecting Croats and Jat people with Sarmatians in southern Russia¹².

The name of the Carpathian Mountains, where the Iranian Croats mingled with the local Slavs, adopting their language, may come from Croats. After the fall of the Hun empire, the Croats had organized the local Slavs and created the country, naming it after themselves. Prior to the invasion of Avars around 560 years, the White Croats and Antes formed a state, stretching from north of the Carpathian Mountains, to the upper Dniester River and upper Elbe River. According to Z. Mandic, the similarity between the Croatian and Slovak languages, can prove the fact that the majority of Croats arrived in the Balkans from the north¹³.

¹⁰ Ibidem, s. 71.

¹¹ Ibidem, s. 81-82.

¹² P. Bein, *Chorwaci i Sarmaci z Iranu*, www.wordpress.com. Marzec 2013.

¹³ Ibidem.

Professor Rustam Abbas claims that there is a resemblance between the name Serbs the name of the river Seropi (Surappi) in Elam. Elam was located on the Persian Gulf in today's southwestern Iran. It was the first advanced civilisation of Iran and, next to the Sumerian, it is considered as one of the most advanced ones. Polytheism was the ruling religion system in Elam, and one of the most important deities was the goddess Kiririsza (her name is similar in beliefs of other peoples in the region). The researchers believe that the special place the goddess took in Elams pantheon is a sign of matriarchy¹⁴.

Several historians claim that the caste of the Serbian rulers had the same origin as the Croats. In a review of the book by Professor Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia* (1996) about the Iranian origin of these two nations, prof. James Salzman writes that *Croats and Serbs (Slavic tribes with the Iranian caste of rulers or Iranian tribes with the Slavic subjects) came into the Balkans around the 620th, and seized the lands that had already been inhabited by the Slavs*. So, Croats and Serbs, who had been speaking the Iranian language, adopted the Slavic language. History records the cases when rulers adopted the language of the subjects: the descendants of the Vikings - Normans adopted French in Normandy and Anglo-Saxon in England, Germanic Merovingians and Carolingians adopted French, Nordic Visigoths - Spanish, Germanic Lombards - the Italian¹⁵.

Z. Mandić believes that although Serbs are mostly descendants of Slavs with round shaped heads, the Croats significantly influenced the Serbian gene pool. According to his study published in 1970, in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, probably *32-35% of Serbs population was descended from the Orthodox Croats, 50-52% from non-Slavic Vlachs, 6-7% from assimilated Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians and Albanians and only 8-10 % from truly ethnic Serbs, who migrated into this area mainly during the Austro – Hungarian rule and during the existence of the former Yugoslavia (before and after World War II)*¹⁶.

Serbs reject this thesis. To justify the Croats right to secede, what eventually was reached unconstitutionally, Croatian science distorted the facts long before the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Serbs quote the western encyclopedias from 1956, 1971 and 1990, according to which, the Serbs settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina before Croats and historically they constituted the majority¹⁷.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ A. Kłoskowska, *Kultury narodowe.....*, s. 167-169.

¹⁷ Ibidem, s. 182.

The Military Frontier Province or so called Krajina (shaded) in the years 1600-1800. The thick dashed line is the boundary between the Ottoman and Habsburg empire. Croatia is a small province, separated from Slavonia, Dalmatia stretches just as far as the Knin on the north. Broz Tito renamed this area collectively to Croatia. During the Islamic invasion, Croatia came under the protection of the Habsburgs in 1527, leaving its southern, adjacent to the Turks, lands abandoned after the population had fled. After expropriating of the landowners, Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand had fortified that area and created there a Military Frontier (Krajina). The Emperor organized the remaining Croats as well as Serbs and Vlachs who had fled north from the Turks, into the military force¹⁸. Soldiers (peasants), were released from serfdom in exchange for service. Regardless of the deep dissatisfaction of Croatian and Hungarian expropriated land owners, Habsburgs strengthened the Krajina, which attracted adventurous and freedom-loving people. In the second half of the eighteenth century Krajina stretched from the Adriatic through the today's Croatia and Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina as far as today's Romania. Even during World War I inhabitants of the Krajina resisted the Croatian nationalists in favor of the Emperor.

Thinkers of each nation, emphasize the dominant role of his own people, forgetting that over the centuries, the state was under the influence of the three great civilizations. Confrontational with each other, bitterly inspired, and provoked by a biased patriotism, "histories remembered"¹⁹ interpret the past in its own way. In the bipolar, black-and-white vision of the world, where only good and evil exists, they present facts very differently. It would be trivial to say that looking at the past is the subject of a permanent reconstruction that depends on the political interests of the ruling²⁰, but noticing that rule, helps to understand the reason for the construction of so many historical falsifications.

The special role in the development of identity is attributed to the structure and organization of personal judgments. A fully formed identity is probably the one of a person whose self-knowledge creates a hierarchical structure. This structure is the most consistent and best-integrated, and allows to see a person as a whole. It is different with people whose self-knowledge creates more loose structure. The relations between the parts are unclear, vague or absent, and the person can not

¹⁸ P. Bein, *Chorwaci i Sarmaci*, wordpress.

¹⁹ M. Dobrowolska-Partyka, *Literatura pogranicza, pogranicza literatury*, Kraków 2004, s. 147.

²⁰ S. P. Ramet, *Thinking ab aut Yugoslavia: Scholary Debates about the Yugoslav Brekup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*, Combridge 2005, p.76.

form the mature beliefs about their own identity²¹. Self-knowledge is an essential component of the personality of every person. It is located on a continuum, stretching from completely non-structured collection, bold and descriptive judgements, to a coherent system of beliefs about oneself, which constitutes a fully integrated cognitive structure. By combining the development of national ideas with processes that create nations B. Giesen points to the artificiality of national construction, claiming that it is based almost exclusively on building and stressing the differences with respect to internal and international dimensions²². The author emphasizes that in the internal national dimension, a specific role is attributed to so-called "bearers of the identity" - social groups, which are responsible for the development and propagation of the national idea.

Along with the progress of the process of building the national structures, the role of the bearers was taken over by the social elite and therefore the elite was opposed to the rest of society. The intelligence gained a certain value in articulating and strengthening of the national myths, which were essential, for the other members of the community, in the creation and propagation of the spirit of the nation. National identity can be also created discursively, it is then a form of social discourse that occurs in many dimensions of social life and in discursive formations.

In the former Yugoslavia (especially during the interwar and postwar period) models of national identity were rising. In some south-Slavic communities, cultural base of regionalism, was most clearly revealed at the end of the nineteenth century. The regional nature of Croatian and Serbian literature, inter alia, provides the image reconstruction of that cultural reality. Antun Gustav Matoš, a representative of the Croatian modernism wrote: "*(...) the lands are the people, and people are the lands, landscape is not only our relationship with the mystery of the harmony of the universe, but also a tangible form of the constant interaction of the primitive, original Croatian soul with our own. We are, like an apple and a bunch of grapes, fruits of our land, the plants here speak the same language as the Croats (...)*"²³. The questions that arise during this period, questions about a specific, geographical location of the center, that is the essence of being Serbian or Croatian, indicate that the relation of identity with the place is essential.

²¹ J. Koziński tytuł i miejsce 1986, s.331-332.

²² A. Bielawska, 'Obcy' i „inni” w teoriach tożsamości europejskiej i wpływ religii chrześcijańskiej na ową tożsamość. *Szkic teoretyczny*, Frankfurt (n. Odry) 2006, s. 57-58.

²³ M. Tanty, *Balkany XX wieku*, Kraków 2003, s. 99.

Established and mythologized sense of ethnic identity is not, in fact, correlated with any specific space. Ideological homeland became a homeland of reborn nations, with whom scattered and mixed ethnic communities identified²⁴. Multidimensional issues of identity and ethnic distinctiveness are proving the old thesis that mythical production is determined by the political reality²⁵. The area of uncertain identity involved the perspective of individual and collective experience of its fundamental determinants such as language, tradition, community of origin. This uncertainty also caused ethnicity in this area, to become a component of the lower self-esteem.

Blurred identity (both individual and collective), is transformed into a kind of super identity. It is closed and immune to changes, set of axioms that not only describe the reality but are also a protection against it. The consequences arising from the transfer of a reflection on the issue of identity, from the individual to the collective level of response, are visible in the characteristics of the ethnic conflict throughout the Balkans. In this context, narrative statements expressing community, and even contextual coexistence of Serbian and Croatian nations (Serbs and Croats), are drawing attention. Bosnians, who since the nineties of the twentieth century, have been searching for the definition their own identity and as readily as their neighbors reached for myths, also couldn't escape the frantic search for a lineage that would be distinct from the neighboring nations. The Gothic, Thracian and Ilirian²⁶ ethnogenesis was argued, and these indigenous theories (often enriched by the element of integration, and the hypothesis of assimilation of Illyrians, the Goths, the Celts and the Vlachs, usually went hand in hand with proofs of strength of Islam in the Balkans. Sarajevo historian and archaeologist E. Imamovic argues that Bosnians are indigenous nation, who had been living in the area for four thousand years. In the process of ethnogenesis an important meaning can be attributed to Ilirian element. Moreover, the uniqueness of this nation is manifested in the fact that despite the migrations, ethnic purity was preserved, as was the case with the Greeks and Albanians²⁷. Linguistic relations with the

²⁴ Ibidem, s. 103-104.

²⁵ A. Giza, *Narodowe i polityczne dążenia Chorwatów w XIX i XX wieku*, Szczecin 2001, s. 108-109.

²⁶ Ruch iliryjski miał charakter zarówno polityczny jak i kulturalny. Propagował utworzenie narodu Iliryjskiego obejmującego Chorwatów, Serbów, Bośniaków i Bułgarów, co wynikało z przekonania o iliryjskim pochodzeniu Słowian. Postulowano zatem przyjęcie wspólnego, iliryjskiego imienia przez wszystkich Słowian południowych połączonych wspólną kulturę narodową i językiem. Stąd też wybór dialektu sztokowskiego łączącego Serbów i Chorwatów. Zob. I. Rapacka, *Leksykon tradycji chorwackich*, Warszawa 1997, s. 74-81.

²⁷ Ibidem, s. 120-121.

neighbors, are explained by the Slavic influence, which, however, did not change the national spirit and character of the Bosnians²⁸.

According to many experts in this field, Bosnians have Slavic roots, and because Slavs settling in the Balkans, were ethnically diverse from the very beginning, only Bosnians settled in Bosnia. In addition, in the Balkans settled the nations not only conscious of their separateness, but also their states: Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Bosnian²⁹.

Bosnians, wishing to indicate their long history, created a myth about the thousand years old statehood. Croats, Macedonians, and Kosovars, are telling a similar story and its source is always the same. In each of these cases we are dealing with neighbors who are questioning the ethnic and historical separateness of the given country. A cursorily marked overtones of Bosnian legends about the origin, have been used by a variety of political options, not only for the differentiation from the Serbs and Croats, but also to serve as an ideological argument for external policy orientation, because supported by the Arab states, Muslim radicals, derive from apocrypha about pre-Turkish origin of Islam³⁰.

Writing about the structural falsifications of history in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, the researcher can also notice a similar phenomenon in his native historiography, and his views on the origins of the nation, seem to be far from patriotic aspirations about the great ancestors. Various discussions about the Bosnian national historical myths, have the task of demonstrating the diversity of the ethnic segment before the advent of the Turkish rule, which seems to be a response to the proclaimed by the Serbian and Croatian historiography position that the Bosnian Muslims were simply Serbs / Croats³¹.

With the weakening of the position of the nation-states which are the main guarantors of the existence of nations, the importance of the cultural factor is increasing. A nation can survive without a country, but devoid of culture it loses its identity. The formation of cultural identity has great importance in the context of security threats. The first step is to differentiate, the more clearly the others are seen, the more they are different, and the stronger is the feeling of distinctiveness and identity. The consequence is the formation of a collective self-image, which

²⁸ R. Kubik, *Na tropie starożytnych Illirów, [w], Albanistyka Polska*, red. I. Sawicka, Toruń 2007, s. 89-91.

²⁹ Ibidem, s. 105-107.

³⁰ D. Herbert, *Religion and Civil Society. Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World*, Burlington 2003, p. 251-252.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 255.

has the following characteristics: duration, the existence of the rituals that are a confirmation of the community, strong links with cultural factors, such as a common origin, religion, historical traditions.

Demographic facts are helping to determine an international relations and national identities to a limited extent. Ethnic spread of nations living in the area of the former Yugoslavia, is mirrored in the statistical reports, censuses and surveys showing the movements of social structures. Since until 1991, that is, until the outbreak of the civil war, these studies were primarily an ideological tool, they are difficult to interpret. The analyzed source materials indicate that the Serbian elite did not express approval of the Croatian peoples' efforts to determine their own national identity³². Centralism clashed with the federal way of looking at the state and republicanism proposed by the Croats. Misunderstandings between the political elites of both nations and the constant tension over how the joint state should be managed, hampered Croatian-Serbian relations in the sphere of politics, culture, religion and language. These problems have directly influenced the differences in mentality between the two nations, emerging especially in times of conflict escalation³³.

Table 1. Census data in Yougoslavia in the years 1921 – 1991. Source: own.

Number of inhabitants in Serbia		Number of inhabitants in Croatia	
1948	6.528.000	1948	3.780.000
1953	6.979.000	1953	3.936.000
1961	7.664.000	1961	4.169.000
1971	8.466.000	1971	4.342.000
1981	9.332.000	1981	4.601.000
1991	9.791.000	1991	4.760.000

³² J. Rapacka, *Godzina Herdera. O Serbach, Chorwatach i idei jugosłowskańskiej*, Warszawa 1995, s. 54-55.

³³ *Ibidem*, s. 61.

In the context of analysis of recognition of identity of Croatian and Serbian nations, demographic data can be regarded as a starting point for further studies on issues that are not “statistical”. It is worth quoting the data conducted on an extremely difficult subject of demographic research, illustrating the structure of the various nations of the Socialist Federal Republic of

Residents of Serbian nationality		Residents of Serian nationality	
1921	4.791.000	1921	3.427.000
1931	5.848.000	1931	3.788.000
1948	6.547.117	1948	3.784.353
1953	7.065.923	1953	3.975.500
1961	7.806.152	1961	4.239.809
1971	8.143.246	1971	4.526.782
1981	8.140.507	1981	4.428.043
1991	8.526.872	1991	4.636.700

Yugoslavia³⁴. According to the last, before the civil war, census, Yugoslavia territory was populated by 36.2% of Serbs and 19.7% of Croats. Statistical research conducted in this area between 1921 -1991, indicates the following demographic movements in the area.

Table 2. Statistical data for the period 1948 –1991. Source: own.

It should be added that according to the census of 1991, in other republics of the former Yugoslavia lived: 2,162,358 of Serbs, and 720,065 of Croats. The national identity crisis that nations living in the Balkans had been experiencing for many years, was not conducive to building a transnational identity. On the contrary, it has caused the awakening of defensive attitudes and often justified fears, of events and groups perceived as foreign. In modern literature, a lot of the chapters are devoted

³⁴ Prawie nie ma miejsca na terenie byłej Jugosławii, gdzie nie byłoby konfliktów narodowych, część zaczęła się jeszcze za rządów komunistycznych (konflikt z Albańczykami w Kosowie). Większość rozgorzała w 1991 r., kiedy to poszczególne narody zaczęły ogłaszać niezależność. Źródło konfliktów, to głównie postawa Serbów i ich byłego prezydenta (1986-2000) Slobodana Miloševića, który dążąc do stworzenia „Wielkiej Serbii”, rozpaliał separatyzm serbski w wielu republikach. W odpowiedzi na agresywne poczynania Serbii ONZ wprowadziła wobec niej szerokie sankcje gospodarcze, kulturalne, polityczne itp. Sankcje ograniczono w 1994 r., kiedy to Serbia przestała wspomagać separatystów w Krajinie, Bośni i Hercegowinie. Zniesiono je po zawarciu porozumienia w Dayton.

to not only the tragedy of the last war, but also to the policy of elimination of the Muslim factor³⁵.

Sense of separateness forming the identity is based on a number of factors differentiating given community from others. A space, that allows the individual to make the identification based on the fixed elements in a changing reality, is one of the crucial factors. It is not only a place of interaction, the backdrop for the events, but also an elementary component of identity. Affecting the ontological separateness of individuals and communities residing in the area, identity is legitimized through the space, which includes a memorials that are significant for the community; monuments commemorating the local (national) heroes, distinctive buildings, landscape. All these elements are co-creating the landscape, that is characteristic of each place³⁶. In the stories, songs, images, the landscape forms the basis that determines one's own existence. Thanks to the presence of symbolic sites, space, is a testament to the history of the region, constituting a community around the area in which interactions take place.

Identity (both local and national), is not only created by "playing" forms of behavior specific to a particular culture, such as holidays, customs, but also by the presence of special places for the community. The values also determine the importance of collective identity. They are a manifestation of the prevailing forms of relationships in the community, which is sanctioned by places important for that community, legalizing the special status of the group. Marking some space as "important" for the community living in the area, can be confusing for the migrant people who are unaware of the history of the area³⁷.

Construction of the identity (both in the individual and collective experience) is in fact not so much building based on experience as on the existence of an ideal type. Through the collective behavior, the ideal type is designed to confirm the identity of the group, and it has a pragmatic function - the consolidation of the community in the face of possible risks. Once a threat is identified, it will be resolved sooner when a large number of individuals are experiencing it as a real threat, not the abstract one, directed against the specific group. The symbolic nature of the territorial membership strengthens the basis for creation of myths that consolidate members of the community, both in formal and cultural terms³⁸.

³⁵ K. Rosner, *Narracja, tożsamość i czas*, Kraków 2003, s. 73-74.

³⁶ Ibidem, s.81.

³⁷ E. Tokorz, *Zmierzch Jugosławii – nowe czasy, nowe języki*, Katowice 2001, s. 89-90.

³⁸ A. Mutanen, *About the nation of identity*, Limes 2006, p. 28-30.

The formation of ethnic identity takes place based on the cultural patterns internalized in the process of socialization within the community by referring to the memorials. The merging of material and linguistic structures, creates a kind of relationship "the individual - the environment," which contextual nature designates a sense of local autonomy. Ideological schemes of nations and ethnic groups are part of the model of perception of others, resulting from conscious, intentional actions. They are characterized by a brief history and linked to various parts of the tradition of the group and the paradigm of nations and ethnic groups. National character exists objectively and is reflected in the customs, folklore and the broader culture of the nation. Two decades of change, it's too short time to be able to talk about attitudes that are shaped and about sanctioned changes in the consciousness. Ethnic relations in the above-described countries are normalized, and elements of ethnic animosity are fading. More and more inter-ethnic ties are created. It should be ensured that these processes are taking place through mutual understanding and respect for ethnic diversity.

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