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GIULIO ANDREOTTI AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE

Abstract:

*There has never been anyone like him in the history of the Italian Republic. A holder of public office since 1946, seven times Prime Minister and thirty-two times minister, Giulio Andreotti, who died in 2013 at the age of 94, has been the embodiment of power. Thanks to his extraordinary political longevity and record-breaking numbers, great attention has developed around him. Evidence of this is provided by a number of interesting historiographical works, which have been published especially after his death, and by the authentic cinematic case represented by Paolo Sorrentino's *Il Divo*. The very recent publication of his *Secret Diaries*, relating to the decade 1979-1989, has also contributed to shed new light on Andreotti's natural political vocation: diplomacy. In his opinion, it was essential for the development of solid international relations and for the enhancement of Italy's geopolitical peculiarities, respecting the bipolar dialectic, Atlantic loyalty and above all the European balance. The main goal of this paper is therefore to retrace Andreotti's activity in defense of the overall stability of the Old Continent, analyzing the distinctive features and inspirational motives of this policy of balance.*

Key words: Giulio Andreotti, Europe, balance, borders, Iron Curtain.

I feel like a normal person, an average man. I know my limits but also the others' ones. In public life you have to administer and represent people as they really are, not as we would describe them in an abstract treatise¹. This is how Giulio Andreotti described himself and his political mission in a famous television interview he gave to Enzo Biagi in the summer of 1980, highlighting the main distinguishing feature of his modus operandi: pragmatism. It is no coincidence, moreover, that the magazine he founded at the beginning of 1955 as the organ of his small faction within the Christian Democracy (DC), *Primavera* (Spring), was called «Concretezza» (Concreteness), in order to emphasize the hiatus that separated

¹Giulio Andreotti, *I Diari Segreti*, edited by Serena e Stefano Andreotti, Solferino, Milano 2020, p. 116.

the simplicity and clarity of Andreotti's political action from the theoretical depth and abstract-speculative complexity of Amintore Fanfani in particular and the main heirs of Giuseppe Dossetti's lesson (Baris 2018; Capperucci 2010; Franco 2010; Franco 2019; Giovagnoli 1996). Hence the focus on the management of power, on its daily administration and on the authoritative exercise of delicate prerogatives, under the banner of common sense, moderation and mediation among different bearers of interests, instances and sensitivities, which are at the basis of every political relationship, both domestically and internationally.

This attitude which, according to Lucio Caracciolo's effective definition, made Andreotti «a manager of the status quo, an administrator of power, not a visionary politician», allowed him to create networks and cultivate contacts and friendships which were so transversal that they ensured him solid connections both in environments naturally close to the DC, with particular reference to the Roman Curia and the U.S. Government, and with the Soviet nomenklatura and the countries of the Eastern bloc. The *Secret Diaries* for the decade 1979-1989, recently published by Serena and Stefano Andreotti, are proof of this and of his natural role of facilitator, especially at times of political impasse for his party. Over the years, the recognition of Andreotti's particular and personal authority was almost unanimous. At an international level, statesmen like Kissinger, Gromiko, Gorbačëv, Schmidt and Genscher were impressed by it. In their memoirs, they acknowledge his extraordinary preparation and competence in the main geopolitical issues and his unparalleled aptitude for dialogue (Kissinger 1982; Gromiko 1989; Gorbačëv 1996; Schmidt 1992; Genscher 1995).

Andreotti at De Gasperi's school

In Italy, however, Alcide De Gasperi was the first to appreciate, not without smug irony, this capacity for intermediation, shown from the very beginning in politics by his main collaborator both at the Viminale and in the ranks of the party (Andreotti 1974, 1977, 1986, 2006; Ballini 2009; Canavero 2003, 2013; Craveri 2012; Malgeri 2006; Preda 2017; Rumi 2004; Scoppola 1988). On 7 October 1950, in a letter that was both humorous and concerned, due to the difficulties which had arisen in the meantime on the two fronts of financing the European Movement and the appointment of the new heads of certain public bodies, De Gasperi addressed Andreotti in this way, pleading sympathetically for a prodigious intervention in the name of mediation and concreteness:

Dear Andreotti, it seems to me that the weather is getting better, so I hope you will enjoy it. I will read «Adesso»: they are certainly dangerous morbidities. We hope to laboriously appoint the "magistrates": but not without anguish for the future. We will put in the administrative magistrates; but also the revenue lawyers?

This will be a breach in the (hypothetical) barrier. My experiences of your candidate for the Cassa² are rather negative. If you had been here, I would have already used you as an intermediary (with this you are always understood!). I am afraid we have made a mistake, and that would be big trouble. I am in trouble for the 20 million for the European Movement. You told me that we would manage it, but in the meantime the Treasury has told me - after two months - no. Nor, in any case, a special law can be made. Suggest³.

These few lines speak volumes about the solidity, the depth and the peculiarity of the relationship that linked Andreotti to De Gasperi, particularly between 1947 and 1954.

It was a truly important relationship, both from a personal and from a more exquisitely political point of view. The young Roman leader, at times, went so far as to attribute a filial significance to it, as can be seen, for example, from a letter of 5 September 1953, in which Andreotti confided to his mentor all his bitterness for the difficult coexistence, within the DC, with people of whom he had little esteem and who were even inducing him to abandon political career:

I do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the DC, not least to avoid problems for Pella, but I cannot help but tell you my concern, not so much for the organization and the means - serious and important problems as well - but for the lack of cohesion in the number of central leaders, the image and symbol of life in the periphery. There are not ten men who count in the DC who really like each other. Nor, I believe, the professional mystics bring a breath of rigor, charity and disinterestedness. They provide accommodating support for their opponents in order to achieve their individual tactical goals [...]. 1953 was a bad year and I often meditate on the usefulness of giving up politics, which becomes increasingly difficult for those who do not want to be tied to lobbies⁴.

Then, at the beginning of the following year, on 18 January, when he took over, even if only for three weeks, the chair of Minister of the Interior, given the immediate fall of the first Fanfani government, Andreotti felt the need to express with genuine filial affection all his gratitude to De Gasperi. If he had arrived at such a post, at barely thirty-five years, he owed it solely and exclusively to the statesman from Trentino, whose direct political inheritance

² De Gasperi probably referred to the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, the special agency just created by the government, to carry out a specific program of public expenditures in the lagging southern regions of Italy, the so-called *Mezzogiorno*.

³ https://epistolariodegasperi.it/#/archivio_digitale/lettera?id=42939c8d-bcf9-4b75-92b5-ca304187076b (accessed on 12 December 2020).

⁴ https://epistolariodegasperi.it/#/archivio_digitale/lettera?id=f76bf157-0d54-4db9-b072-6289e9abbccf (accessed on 12 December 2020).

Andreotti came to claim with these words of grateful greeting, precisely at the moment when his long apprenticeship at his school was coming to an end:

Dear President, in this very special moment of my life, when I find myself with a great responsibility while perhaps my soul was longing for at least a period of rest, I am sustained by your teaching of absolute dedication even when it may seem that it is not worth the effort to get involved in the intricate business of politics. When you called me to Viminale in 1947, I was appalled and frightened, but I have tried to make up for my deficiencies with the intensity of my work and with a daily effort to spare you - and, later, Pella - as many difficulties as possible. In the moments of bitterness caused by external events or by unnecessary polemics, I have often felt the desire to change my "profession", but I have been distracted not only by my filial attachment to you, but also by the smile of a poor benefactor or the satisfaction of a man to whom justice has been done through us. These oases are the perspective that sustains me at the beginning of this new phase of action. I would say something conventional if I told you to consider myself always most devoted to you. But allow an old "Voltaire supporter", as you once called me, to ask you to still love me like a son⁵.

Andreotti, who did not know his father, having lost him when he was two years old, undoubtedly found in De Gasperi a fundamental paternal guide. But if his contribution proved important for the personal and emotional growth of the young Roman leader, it was fundamental and decisive for his public life.

De Gasperi was first and foremost the man who initiated Andreotti into his true dimension, that of diplomacy, geopolitics and foreign policy which, in the vision of the statesman from Trentino, fully inherited by Andreotti, was so important to shape the dynamics of domestic politics, all the more so in a country like Italy⁶. De Gasperi then contributed, through the shining example offered in Paris, during the Peace Conference, to making him understand the absolute importance of mediation, credibility, balance and authority for the international ranking of Italy, so strongly in need of the others' trust, but also destined at that moment to play a fundamental role in the process of European reconstruction. Hence the rediscovery of the ethical and historical value, even before the geopolitical one, of what the Old Continent could have represented after the war: the ideal stage for the rebirth of humanity and for the recovery of the true Christian roots (Chenaux 1990; Canavero-Durand 1999; Formigoni 2009; D'Angelo 2017).

⁵https://epistolariodegasperi.it/#/archivio_digitale/lettera?id=bbd84669-70a9-4bca-a0ee-453f98399580 (accessed on 12 December 2020).

⁶Giulio Andreotti, *I Diari Segreti*, cit., p. 219.

The centrality of Europe and the problems of border areas

Of course, this great ideal (Chabod 1962), which was already part of Andreotti's strong cultural background, clashed at the time with the harsh reality of a continent destroyed and divided internally by rigid borders, the result of the balance of power defined at the end of the Second World War. Andreotti attended in fact that great school represented by the Italian Catholic University Federation (FUCI), where Giovanni Battista Montini's lessons on the origins of the Holy Roman Empire⁷ in particular inspired the Europeanist commitment of an entire generation of future Christian Democrat leaders (Marcocchi 1988; Molinari-Trebeschi 1994; Citterio-Vaccaro 2000; Villani 2017). The real political challenge of the moment was therefore very ambitious: reconcile the ideal and the real, working concretely and according to the new geopolitical order to improve the daily living conditions of millions of people, avoiding dangerous leaps forward and trying above all to solve the many political, cultural, economic and social problems arising from the balance of borders, which constituted the Europe's geopolitical feature. In this frame, De Gasperi chose Giulio Andreotti to carry out this mission. In 1947 the young Roman leader was in fact appointed political head of the Border Areas Office (UZC) (D'Amelio-Di Michele-Mezzalira 2015; Gheda-Robbe 2015).

In this role, the young undersecretary to the Prime Minister's Office could experience the weight of assuming important responsibilities on a daily basis and identify his personal way of exercising power in mediation, conciliation and confrontation. He was evidently induced to do this by the fact that he had to deal every day with a physical-geographical but also and above all political-diplomatic limit, represented by the border, and by the consequent problem of managing relations with Yugoslavia and Austria, influenced respectively by the tragedy of the Julian-Dalmatian exiles and by the dispute over Trieste and the territories of Julian Venetia (Colummi-Ferrari-Nassisi-Trani 1980; Pupo 2005; Miletto 2007; Bucarelli 2008; Hrobat Virgolet-Gousseff-Corni 2015; Pupo 2016; Monzali 2016; Vallerin 2018) and by the South Tyrol question (Vallini 1961; Toscano 1967; Alcock 1970; Pastorelli 1977; Steininger 1999; Gehler 2005; Monzali 2016). At the beginning of his political and governmental activity, these were the main commitments for Andreotti. The young undersecretary dedicated himself to them, following scrupulously the three fundamental directives De Gasperi had given him: to defend, as far as possible, the Italian identity of the border areas; to neutralize the potential threat of Pan-German nationalism; to avoid, on the Italian side, jeopardizing the precarious geopolitical balance, within which the government would have to play all its cards, in order to defend the national interest in the best possible way.

⁷Giovanni Battista Montini, *Note scolastiche per la storia della diplomazia pontificia*, Studium, Roma 1934.

In Alto Adige (South Tyrol), for example, Andreotti undertook to enforce the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement of September 1946 and to protect the rights of German-speaking citizens who, after having moved to Nazi Germany and having acquired German citizenship, were now returning to the Italian borders and had to be reintegrated into the territory of the province of Bolzano (Moscati 1972; Gaja 1988; Serra 1988; Corsini 1993; Delle Donne 1999; Scarano 2012; Bernardini 2016). He also had to supervise the political-administrative activity of the new Trentino-Alto Adige region and the defense of the Italian culture and identity of the territory, closely cooperating with the local ecclesiastical authorities and supporting the resumption of the activities of a symbolic place for the Italian community in the area, such as the splendid Merano-Maia racecourse (Gelmi 1984; Gelmi 1986; Landoni 2010). Carrying out these delicate tasks, Andreotti had to deal with the main problem produced by the policy of forced Italianization of that territory implemented by Fascism (Gruber 1979; Steurer 1980; Corsini-Lill 1988; Corsini 1994; Steininger 1999): the civil coexistence between citizens of different language and culture. He had also to face the fury recently shown by the rancorous and frustrated German community towards Ettore Tolomei⁸, the man who had literally invented the term Alto Adige and the Italian names of all the towns and places between the Stretta di Salorno, to the South, and the Brenner Pass, to the North. On Mussolini's mandate, Tolomei had also proceeded to the forced Italianization of several German surnames (Ferrandi 1986; Framke 1987; Benvenuti-von Hartungen 1998).

Among the many tasks of the period, Andreotti had to deal with an issue that was certainly marginal from a diplomatic and administrative point of view, but had a high symbolic and political value, in defense of the Italian identity of Alto Adige: the reconstruction of the Tolomei family tomb in Gleno di Montagna (Montan), vandalized for political reasons by unknown citizens of the German-speaking community. The Italian government acceded to the request for compensation made to the Prime Minister's Office by Ettore Tolomei himself, who wrote to Andreotti on 18 January 1948, thanking him for his prompt intervention and the thoughtful written reply of 29 November 1947 to his request and expressing formal praise for the De Gasperi government's policy of defending the Italian culture in South Tyrol:

Your Excellency, following your kind letter of 29 November concerning the payment for the reconstruction at the expense of the State of the tomb destroyed at the Montagna Alto Adige Cemetery, I received, on 7 January 1948, the money order for 260,000 lire, of which I enclose a receipt. In accordance with previous

⁸[http://notes9.senato.it/web/senregno.nsf/All/DFBED6D5480ACFB64125646F00610D9A/\\$FILE/2208%20Tolomei%20Ettore%20fascicolo.pdf](http://notes9.senato.it/web/senregno.nsf/All/DFBED6D5480ACFB64125646F00610D9A/$FILE/2208%20Tolomei%20Ettore%20fascicolo.pdf) (accessed on 12 December 2020).

agreements, I have remitted this amount to the Civil Engineers of Trento, who are taking on the relative work. In asking you to renew to H.E. the Prime Minister the senses of my profound gratitude, for the eloquent act that puts an end to political crimes up there, I beg you to receive my best regards⁹.

In the decision to grant his request and thus finance the restoration of the family tomb, Tolomei wrongly saw the basis for a direct continuity between his own commitment to the forced Italianization of South Tyrol during the Fascist Ventennio and the policy pursued by the De Gasperi government in the border areas and in South Tyrol in particular. Here, in his opinion, the Prime Minister himself had proved capable of teaching the German community a resounding lesson and defending the primacy of Italian identity. But this was not at all the inspirational principle of the daily action taken by the Andreotti-De Gasperi duo in the multilingual regions, where the government pursued a policy based on balance and moderation, while obviously defending Italian identity. This is proved for example, along the eastern border, by the warm invitation that the Prime Minister's Office, in August 1949, addressed to Father Alfonso Orlini, founder of the National Association Julian Venetia and Dalmatia (ANVGD), to dissuade the Julian-Dalmatian exiles registered with it from organizing, on 11 September, a demonstration commemorating the Fiume enterprise¹⁰, in front of Gabriele D'Annunzio's house-museum in Gardone Riviera, the so-called *Vittoriale degli Italiani*.

The dissuasive initiative, so to speak, was taken with this urgent telegram that Andreotti sent to De Gasperi on 15 August 1949:

We have learnt from the newspaper «Difesa Adriatica» that Father Orlini has issued an appeal to the members of the Julian Committee for a large commemoration of the Fiume enterprise to be held at the so-called *Vittoriale degli Italiani* on the 11th September. Please authorize me to issue a warning to the promoters in an urban but firm manner, if necessary resorting to a ban on public security¹¹.

⁹https://epistolariodegasperi.it/#/archivio_digitale/lettera?id=b369dc8d-a1a6-4aeb-b402-f29281ed4e06 (accessed on 12 December 2020).

¹⁰ The third issue of «Memoria e Ricerca» for 2020, edited by Annarita Gori and Marco Cuzzi, is entirely dedicated to Fiume Enterprise: *Fiume 1919-20. Uno sguardo internazionale*.

¹¹https://epistolariodegasperi.it/#/archivio_digitale/lettera?id=608368fc-3cac-4f73-833b-c01b0d664a9f (accessed on 12 December 2020).

And immediately the Prime Minister endorsed Andreotti, with these unequivocal words: «Make an invitation to Father Orlini on my behalf as well and in case of resistance promote a ban»¹².

Andreotti and Spain: among Sports Diplomacy, Atlantism and the European Perspective

At stake, on the other hand, there were international balances, the relations both with the victorious countries of the Second World War and with Germany and Austria, and above all Italy's future. Albeit in strict compliance with the bipolar order and the Atlantic alliance, the government should have carved out small but important margins for maneuver, functional to pursue national interests. The rigid scheme in which Italy had to operate and the logic of the borders represented, after all, useful elements of clarity and simplification of the international framework and, above all, of the European chessboard. Within it Rome would have tried to assert and weigh in every possible way its geographical and geopolitical position and its projection in the Mediterranean quadrant.

Hence the need to reactivate stable diplomatic relations with Spain, whose isolation had to be avoided, without obviously underestimating the difficulties represented by the anti-democratic nature of its government and the impossibility for Madrid to join organically NATO (Brundu Olla 1990; Micheletta 2017). Andreotti's mission to Madrid in March 1949 proved decisive for this purpose. Appointed by De Gasperi to represent the government at the Spain-Italy football match, won 3-1 by the Azzurri, their last match before the Superga tragedy and the death of the *Grande Torino*¹³, he met Francisco Franco's undersecretary, Luis Carrero Blanco, and the foreign minister and former president of Catholic Action, Alberto Martín-Artajo, as well as the Apostolic Nuncio, Gaetano Cicognani. From being a mere visit of courtesy and representation, at the invitation of the Spanish Football Federation, Andreotti's mission to Madrid ended up acquiring, albeit informally, the importance of a government bilateral meeting. The oppositions became aware of it only several weeks later¹⁴. It was in particular the communist senator Umberto Terracini,

¹²https://epistolariodegasperi.it/#/archivio_digitale/lettera?id=c88e2053-f422-4ccc-8c56-deac67a76f68 (accessed on 12 December 2020).

¹³This epithet is used to remember and recall the unforgettable sport deeds of Torino Football Club in the 1940s, five-time Italian champion and appreciated all around the world for its quality and style. Its players were the backbone of the Italian national team, the so-called *Azzurri*. They died on 4 May 1949, returning from Lisbon, in the plane crash known as the Superga air disaster.

¹⁴*Il Senato si inchina riverente alla memoria di Floriano Del Secolo. Il viaggio di Andreotti in Spagna*, in «l'Unità», 22 June 1949; *Andreotti non assolse a Madrid incarichi di carattere politici*, in «Corriere della Sera», 22 June 1949.

who accused the young undersecretary and the entire government of having covertly attempted to take specific initiatives, at an international level, without informing the Parliament, and of having, in some way, politically exploited a simple football match¹⁵.

Actually, Andreotti's so-called sports diplomacy made its official debut in Madrid. Andreotti was convinced that every sport event not only constituted a useful opportunity to establish and develop contacts and interpersonal relations, but also had an intrinsic political meaning, to be exploited on a diplomatic level (Sbetti 2012; Forcellese 2013; Sbetti-Tulli 2016; Brizzi-Sbetti 2018; Landoni 2019; Sbetti 2020). Andreotti's highly personal approach to Italian-Spanish relations proved to be extremely fruitful on both the private and political fronts. It was in fact within this framework that, during the 1950s, just before Cortina 1956 Winter Olympics and Rome 1960 Summer Olympics, which marked the apogee of Andreotti's sports diplomacy, a special relationship, destined to last a lifetime, developed between the Christian Democrat leader and the *deus ex machina* of the Spanish sports movement, Juan Antonio Samaranch. At that time, he began his unstoppable rise to the top of the International Olympic Committee, in parallel with his upgrade through the ranks of Spanish politics and diplomacy (Boix-Espada 1991; Miller 1994; Pernas i López 2015). And it was of course in this context that Italy consolidated its partnership with Spain, thanks to the commercial and cultural agreements, signed respectively in 1952 and in 1955, and favored Spain's diplomatic thaw and Atlantic anchorage, endorsing the concordat with the Holy See, signed in August 1953, and of the mutual defense agreement that Madrid concluded with Washington in September 1953 (Pereira 1995).

Despite Franco's regime and the legitimate reservations about it expressed by DC government allies and, even more so, by the socialists and the communists, Rome considered the relationship with Madrid strategic and necessary, in order to strengthen the European bastion of the free world, within the transatlantic relationship, and keep Spain closely connected, albeit naturally from a position outside it, to the nucleus of the founding countries of the European Community (Brundu Olla 1984; Branciforte 2016).

The role played by Andreotti, who was Minister of Defense from 1959 to 1966, was absolutely important on this front and for the Italian-American relations (Gentiloni Silveri 1998; Nuti 1999; D'Angelo 2009). During these years, also because of the substantial failure of the tripartite agreement signed by Italy, France and Germany for the joint production of nuclear weapons and the emergence of an objectively critical element for intra-European and transatlantic relations, represented by De Gaulle's foreign and nuclear policy, Andreotti

¹⁵<http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/487078.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

worked on developing a privileged relationship with Germany (Nutti 2007; Scarano 2017). It was based on the idea that the process of European unification, contrasting De Gaulle's wishes, should contribute to further strengthening, for the Old Continent, the strategic significance of the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship with Washington, enhancing the European role within it. For Rome and Bonn, the US Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) project would certainly have been functional to this design and to the neutralization of the French-led European nuclear directorate project, cultivated by De Gaulle. In terms of defense, he aimed in fact at transforming Europe into a third force (Nutti 2007). The U.S. Administration, which was unable to complete the MLF project because of the dramatic developments in the Vietnam war, at that time considered Andreotti as its main European interlocutor. As can be seen from the minutes of the meeting that took place on 16 December 1963 between him and his American counterpart, Robert McNamara, at the Hotel George V in Paris¹⁶, Andreotti was urged by the Johnson administration not only to report on the attitude of the main European chancelleries towards the MLF project, but to ensure the full support of the Italian government, acting as guarantor of the reliability of the socialists (PSI), who had just joined the government alliance, and therefore of the perfect continuity, in terms of Atlantic loyalty, between the years of centrism¹⁷ and the new season of the center-left¹⁸.

In the footsteps of Brandt: Andreotti's Ostpolitik in the framework of détente

At that time, Andreotti had no choice but to give broad reassurances on the delicate issue of Atlantic policy, which, especially in the perspective of détente, should have taken on a more dynamic and pragmatic profile. It was not by chance that Andreotti's attitude, once he took over the government in 1972, was inspired by this principle. He was convinced that Italy's absolute loyalty to the Atlantic alliance could not have prevented the government, especially in the wake of the brilliant results of Brandt's Ostpolitik for the defense of détente, cooperation and stability in Europe, from pursuing specific national interests, developing closer relations with the Eastern bloc countries (Di Nolfo 2010; Tavani 2010).

In this framework, Andreotti decided to strengthen the axis with Bonn and immediately set off along the road traced by Brandt beyond the curtain,

¹⁶<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177876> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

¹⁷It was a political formula which characterized the governments of the Italian Republic between the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s. DC, the Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and the Italian Republican Party (PRI) formed the centrist coalition.

¹⁸It was a coalition of four political parties, DC, PRI, PSDI and PSI, that formed governments throughout the 1960s and the middle 1970s.

with the aim of guaranteeing Italy as well the beneficial economic and political effects deriving from the definitive normalization of the relations between Federal Germany and socialist countries, sanctioned in particular by the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and then, in 1972, by the fundamental treaty between Federal Republic of Germany (RFT) and the German Democratic Republic (DDR) (Hofmann 2007; Ludlow 2007; Loth-Soutou 2008; von Dannenberg 2008; Fink-Schaefer 2009; Möckli 2009; Villaume-Westad 2010). With no delay, the Italian Prime Minister, who would also contribute decisively to the organization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), went to the Soviet Union in October 1972 on a mission of great geopolitical importance (Forcellese 2020). Its climax, during the busy meetings that took place between 24 and 29 October, was undoubtedly the signing at the Kremlin of the treaty on merchant shipping and, above all, of the protocol of Italian-Soviet consultations. According to it, Rome and Moscow, while respecting their international obligations previously undertaken, agreed to intensify their consultations «on the major international problems of common interest and on issues concerning their bilateral relations»¹⁹, «to strengthen world peace», consolidating détente and security in Europe, and to organize regular consultations and meetings twice a year. Under the terms and the effects of this agreement, Italy and the Soviet Union, which had been careful not to question the bipolar logic, decided to make an historic qualitative leap in their relationship.

During this mission, the inauguration of the Moscow new branch of the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce surely represented another important event, for its political, economic and strategic implications. This section, which was integrated with the activities of the Rome office inaugurated in 1964, should have encouraged the further development of trade exchanges and fully implemented the 1968 agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, to which three hundred and fifty Italian companies and forty-five Soviet foreign trade organizations had signed up. Now the deepening of Italian-Soviet diplomatic relations should have been matched by an analogous and adequate increase in economic relations. In this perspective, the role played by the FIAT plant in Togliatti would have been decisive (Chivino 2014). So that was Andreotti's main destination on 27 October. For the first time since its opening in 1966, an Italian delegation visited the Volga car plant (VAZ)²⁰.

Andreotti's demanding mission to the Soviet Union was soon followed by another very important act, fundamental for the geopolitical, strategic and economic role played by Italy beyond the Iron Curtain. On 18th January 1973,

¹⁹<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1972%20Testi%20e%20Documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

²⁰Ibid.

three weeks after the *Grundlagenvertrag* signed in East Berlin by Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl, the second Andreotti government proceeded in fact to the official establishment of normal diplomatic relations, «at ambassador level, between the Italian Republic and the German Democratic Republic»²¹. On this basis, Rome then decided to strengthen trade exchange with East Berlin, encouraging the participation of Italian companies in the traditional Leipzig spring trade fair, and above all, exactly three months after the normalization of diplomatic relations, signing an ambitious agreement for economic, industrial and technical cooperation between the two countries. Signed in Rome by Matteo Matteotti, Minister for Foreign Trade, and his East German counterpart, Horst Soelle, the agreement had a ten-year duration and was the first ever of that kind signed by the German Democratic Republic with a market economy country. Hence its historical importance, further emphasized by the fact that it represented a real reference model for similar agreements concluded with other socialist countries. Among these, particular mention should be made of the agreements signed in 1973 with the Soviet Union and in 1974 with Poland²², which Edward Gierek, in the framework of his «Polish Market Socialism» (Tavani 2014), was trying to open up strongly to trade with the EEC countries and Italy in particular.

For Rome, these were the years of the full affirmation of its policy of strong commitment and projection towards the Eastern bloc countries. Excellent feedback would come, on the other hand, from the positive results of the CSCE (Bange-Niedhart 2008), which strengthened even more, if possible, Italy's European profile and Andreotti's strategy, consolidating the balance of détente, the bipolar logic and above all the continental status quo. In the European context the Italian government was carving out and could continue to play a very important role. On the western front, it would act as the first supporter of EEC enlargement and economic-political development, joining for example the Monetary Economic System (SME). Beyond the Iron Curtain, it would enhance its strong commitment for political, economic and cultural cooperation and its further development.

In this context, between 1976 and 1979, with the return of Giulio Andreotti in the office of Prime Minister, the positive results of the mission to Moscow by the Foreign Minister, Arnaldo Forlani, took on particular significance in defending this balance. Between the 10th and 14th of January, 1977, the reasons which, five years earlier, had led Italy and the USSR to sign the protocol of consultations were resumed and deepened. This agreement

²¹<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1973%20Testi%20e%20Documeti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

²²<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1974%20Testi%20e%20Documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

contributed also to the solution of a number of problems concerning the activities of big Italian companies in Soviet territory, with particular reference to Montedison and FIAT, whose president, Gianni Agnelli, would then participate, on the 22nd of February 1977, in the opening session of the annual assembly of the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce in Moscow²³.

Against nationalism and the destabilization of the European balance

The entry into force of the Treaty of Osimo, according to Law 14 March 1977, n. 73²⁴ (Monzali 2004; Bucarelli 2009, Zaccaria 2020), and the subsequent official visit to Belgrade by minister Forlani were, if possible, even more important²⁵. Despite the indignant protests of the Julian-Dalmatian exiles, Rome definitively closed the Adriatic question and began to further strengthen the economic exchange with Tito's regime and Italy's position in the Balkan area. The Alpe-Adria project, launched in November 1978 by the president of the Veneto region, the Christian Democrat Carlo Bernini, in agreement with the Prime Minister Andreotti and the governments of Federal Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia, which then also opened up to Hungary, with the aim of fostering cross-border exchanges and economic and cultural cooperation among their border regions (Poropat 1993; Varsori 2013; Varsori 2014), should have contributed to extending the Italian influence in the Adriatic-Danubian quadrant. The project of the so-called Europe of the Regions (ISPI 1988) was thus taking shape. Regardless of the lack of homogeneity of the political, economic and social models of the countries involved, according to the Italian wishes, it could really change the meaning of the word border, as Andreotti said on the tenth anniversary of Alpe-Adria foundation: «no longer synonymous with closure or separation, between ideologies, between blocs of powers; on the contrary, synonymous with dialogue and mediation»²⁶.

The Alpe-Adria working community would have also been functional to neutralize the serious threat represented by nationalism. In Andreotti's geopolitical vision, it could have destroyed the precious balance that had been painstakingly rebuilt in Europe after two world wars. The Christian Democrat statesman particularly targeted the resurgence of Pan-Germanism, of which he saw evidence in the Schützen demonstrations in South Tyrol and in the Austrian Tyrol (Obermair-Risse-Romeo 2012), as well as in the actual terrorist acts in the

²³<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1977%20Testi%20e%20Documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

²⁴<https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1977/03/21/077U0073/sg> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

²⁵<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1977%20Testi%20e%20Documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

²⁶<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1988%20Testi%20e%20documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

province of Bolzano and in the intemperance of some Bavarian extremists. It is no coincidence that this is a topic that features prominently in his *Secret Diaries*²⁷, relating to the period 1979-1989, when the unexpected resumption of the US-USSR dialectic could not only have upset the international order, but also damaged Italy's role and interests. Notwithstanding the new hotbeds of tension, Rome should have done everything possible to safeguard the European balance, keeping open, on the one hand, the channel of dialogue and cooperation with the socialist regimes and, on the other, working on the enlargement of the European Community. For some time, in fact, these had been the two pillars of the geopolitics of balance, pursued by the Italian government and embodied by Andreotti in particular.

In these years, the Christian Democrat statesman met, in the informality of his private office in piazza Montecitorio 115, the ambassadors of almost all the countries of the world and very often in particular the American, the Soviet and the other Warsaw Pact ones, as demonstrated by the *Secret Diaries*. In this context, the coldness with which he observed the birth of Solidarity in Poland should come as no surprise. Actually, dissent beyond the Iron Curtain was a very delicate issue for Andreotti, because of its objective humanitarian implications. But above all it represented a thorny problem, potentially able to affect the excellent relations developed with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries and therefore to disrupt the European balance. As early as 1977, Andreotti and his Foreign Minister, Forlani, had found themselves in the embarrassing and difficult situation to deal with the extremely harsh stance taken by the Soviet government²⁸, through the ambassador to Rome, Nikita Ryzhov, towards the *Biennale del Dissenso*²⁹ (Spiri-Zaslavski 2006; Ripa di Meana-Mecucci 2007). The Venetian kermesse, in which all the countries of the Warsaw Pact could no longer participate, was considered by Moscow as an act of open hostility towards the USSR and all its allies and therefore a serious threat to the maintenance of solid relations with Italy. Hence the request for a clarifying initiative by the Italian government, which, while formally rejecting the inadmissible request to intervene in the free initiatives of the Biennale and defending the freedom of expression constitutionally guaranteed, did not officially support Ripa di Meana's artistic project, deserting Biennale main events.

²⁷G. Andreotti, *I Diari Segreti*, cit., p. 135; p. 408; p. 463; pp.529-530; p. 577; p. 633.

²⁸<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1977%20Testi%20e%20Documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

²⁹The Biennale refers to an arts organization based in [Venice](#), where it is responsible for the organization of biennial exhibitions. They traditionally focus on contemporary art, dance, architecture, literature, cinema and theatre. Under the presidency of the socialist Carlo Ripa di Meana, the 1977 edition was dedicated to dissent beyond the Iron Curtain.

The substantial absence from his *Diaries* of specific references to the profound political, economic and social reasons that had led to the birth of Solidarity is thus fully justified. It was only in October 1981 that Andreotti decided to dedicate a more detailed analysis to the Polish situation. He focused on it, just at the end of his short mission in Warsaw, where he had been invited as president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and met his daughter Marilena, recently moved there with her husband, the diplomat Ferruccio Marri Caciotti³⁰. Not appreciating the enthusiastic and simplistic comments with which, in his opinion, the birth of Solidarity had been greeted in Italy, Andreotti wrote:

Departure for Rome on the 23rd. Forty hours in Warsaw is such a short time that I cannot assess the situation, make judgments or forecasts. However, I have strengthened my opinion that the complexity of the problems is such that they require much more prudence abroad than is normally the case. In fact, alongside the political issues and the attempt at a completely new trade union model, there is a dual economic aspect to consider. On the one hand, there is the reduction in production and the currency deficit, leading to food rationing, long queues for supplies; on the other hand, the COMECON countries have an integrated energy industrial plan, so that the Polish slowdown has immediate repercussions in East Germany, Hungary and so on. Anyone who does not take these aspects into account is putting himself in an inadequate and merely polemical position, which is of no benefit to either the Poles or the others³¹.

Woe betide, therefore, anyone who waved the flag of freedom and human rights superficially, without adequately considering the general picture and, above all, the risk of an unexpected and dangerous deterioration of the complex political, economic and social balance of Central-Eastern Europe. Andreotti, who had stressed the existence of a strong economic interdependence among the Warsaw Pact countries, feared that the potential political destabilization of Poland could have triggered a real domino effect beyond the Iron Curtain, for which the whole of Europe and Italy in particular were totally unprepared.

It was naturally the logic of realpolitik that inspired Giulio Andreotti, whose pragmatism was not appreciated by everyone within the DC, especially in light of what was happening in Poland. At the beginning of 1982, as the Roman statesman recounts in his *Diaries*, he had a bitter confrontation with Carlo Donat-Cattin, who had accused him of never having shown «effective solidarity

³⁰https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2015/01/stati_servizio_cessati.pdf (accessed on 12 December 2020).

³¹G. Andreotti, *I Diari Segreti*, cit., p. 225.

with the Polish people»³². But it was certainly not this criticism that changed Andreotti's structured realist approach to international relations. Between 4th August 1983 and 23rd July 1989 he would serve uninterruptedly as Foreign Minister in the governments led by Bettino Craxi, Amintore Fanfani, Roberto Gorla and Ciriaco De Mita. The continuity of this pragmatic approach was thus proved by the participation of the Italian ambassador to Moscow, Giovanni Migliuolo, in November 1983, the only one among Westerners, in the military parade for the 66th anniversary of the Soviet revolution, and the real diplomatic offensive that the Italian government conducted in 1984 beyond the Iron Curtain, touching in particular Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Poland (Di Nolfo, 2007; Petracchi 2007; Landoni 2018; Landoni 2019).

The *Italian Ostpolitik* was based on these fundamental guidelines: cooperation, dialogue and, above all, balance, which the resurgent debate on German reunification could have totally jeopardized. For this reason, speaking on 13 September 1984 at the *Festa dell'Unità*³³ in Rome, Andreotti had taken a clear position in favor of maintaining the status quo of the German borders and the existence of RFT and DDR. As Andreotti noted in his *Diaries*, it was the following salacious remark that unleashed the wrath of the German government, soon calmed by the intervention of the ambassador to Bonn, Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, and by a reassuring statement issued by the Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi: «I love Germany so much that I prefer two of it»³⁴. In Andreotti's opinion, this bitter remark was justified by the persistence of a dangerous pan-German and anti-Italian sentiment. Using the South Tyrol issue as a pretext, as the Tyrolese extremists had done four days earlier in Innsbruck, celebrating the 175th anniversary of Andreas Hofer's victory over Napoleon's army and arguing with Rome, could have seriously damaged the European balance. That is why he wrote in his *Diaries*: «What I want to say is that just talking about the reunification of the *two Germanies* at the moment would lead any Soviet effort to work for détente to failure».

Andreotti and the enlargement of the EEC: the entry of Portugal and Spain and the Austria's rapprochement

At that juncture, it would not have been appropriate to tackle divisive issues that could potentially weaken the European continent as a whole and create unnecessary tensions within the European Community itself, dealing with the process of enlargement. In this context, Andreotti's role in securing the entry of Portugal and especially Spain into the EEC was naturally decisive. His

³²Ivi, p. 238.

³³It was an annual festival organized by the [Italian Communist Party](#) to finance and spread its official newspaper, «[l'Unità](#)», founded by Antonio Gramsci in 1924.

³⁴G. Andreotti, *I Diari Segreti*, cit., p. 400.

mediation work, which culminated, despite France's strong resistance, in the European agreement of March 1985, during the semester of Italian presidency, was an authentic masterpiece of diplomacy. It represented the crowning achievement of a geopolitical design, functional to enhance the Europe's political profile, to strengthen the Mediterranean area and the role played by Italy into this quadrant, and to hinder any French-German leadership attempt (Micheletta 2017).

The political consolidation of Europe could certainly have benefited from the entry of Austria into the EEC, a fundamental country for cross-border trade and above all for the Alpine transit of Italian goods along the North-South axis. With Austria in the EEC, this movement could certainly have become even faster and more agile. Due to its strategic position, Vienna could have also contributed to bringing Western European countries closer to those beyond the curtain (Monzali 2017).

In Austria, the main supporter of the adhesion to the EEC was the skillful and enterprising Foreign Minister Alois Mock (Eichtinger-Wohnout 2012). Since the autumn of 1987 and then officially in the summer of 1989, he had sought and obtained an important support from his Italian counterpart, who had in fact long been convinced of the usefulness of this turning point. Andreotti made Rome's support for the enlargement of the EEC to include Austria depend on the definitive solution of two pending questions: the problem of Vienna's neutrality and therefore of a general agreement to be reached with Moscow and above all the dispute over Alto Adige. Italy envisaged a medium-long time frame for the desirable Austrian adhesion, which in fact took place only in 1995, three years after the closure of the South Tyrol dispute (Munich 1992). For Andreotti, it had to be included in the framework of a revolutionary, albeit controlled and peaceful, transformation of the European order, now unavoidable even for him. This process had been triggered by the important changes taking place especially in Hungary and Poland.

Andreotti faced with the 1989 turning points: towards the rebuilding of Europe's historical unity

Andreotti had the opportunity to talk about the profound historical meaning of this evolution, capable of further enhancing the cultural and geopolitical role of Europe and its unity, in Warsaw on 13 May 1989. It was on the occasion of the ceremony for the conferment of his second honorary degree in Poland, after the first conferred on him in 1984 by the University of Toruń³⁵. Andreotti's speech before the highest authorities of the University of Warsaw deserves special attention. It is in fact the most authentic, clear and effective

³⁵<http://www.farnesina.ipzs.it/images/biblioteca/testi/1984%20Testi%20e%20Documenti%20sulla%20politica%20estera%20dell'Italia.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

expression of his political, cultural and strategic vision of Europe. And above all, it contains the inspiring principles of the initiatives that the Italian government, headed by him, was to take between 1989 and 1991 in the face of German unification (Weidenfeld-Wagner-Bruck 1988; Zelikow-Rice 1996; Kohl 2005; Ritter 2009; Rödder 2009; Schwarz 2012), the Yugoslav crisis (Magaš 1993; Pirjevec 1993; Judah 1997; Meier 1999; Lampe 2000; Pavlowitch 2002; Lusa 2007) and the Albanian emergency (Micheletta 2013; Varsori 2013), as demonstrated by these passages in particular:

Two forces are driving our continent and producing profound changes: the progress of integration in Western Europe and the process of diversification and democratization in Eastern Europe. While interdependence may still seem like a generic and undefined concept for understanding the bonds that are being painstakingly built up every day in international relations, it takes on a very different weight and concreteness when referred to Europe. A Western Europe that is more united on the basis of freedom and pluralism cannot but be an even more valid point of reference for Eastern Europe and its changes [...]. The Western democracies are looking with some trepidation at the transformations taking place beyond the old fence between East and West and the word Europe is once again valid, in Budapest as in Warsaw, as the symbol of a civilization, the choice of a common destiny. I would like to recall De Gasperi's words on Western integration in order to strengthen young people's commitment: "What ideal should we give our youth as regards international relations, the future of our Europe, the world future, security, peace, if not this effort towards union? Do you want the myth of dictatorship, the myth of glory, the myth of the flag? I tell you that this myth of unity is also a myth of peace". The spirit of democracy affirmed by you today is manifested in the most typical of democratic processes, the electoral one [...]. The institutional transformations in the East will therefore be able to take us a long way and strengthen the moment of convergence between the "two Europe". We must learn to make these two great movements progress in parallel. A wise, realistic and far-sighted diplomacy will have to succeed in this [...]. The unifying element in Europe is, above all, the culture and the critical consciousness that has fuelled its progress. Today aspirations have the character of a peaceful revolution, and indeed the social term revolution is borrowed from astronomy [...]. Today European politics seem to be an authentic Copernican revolution. The individual is placed at the center of both economic development and security. Elective affinities buried by forty years of suspicion and mistrust are more likely to re-emerge. The Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, Karol Grosz, speaking recently in Davos, said: "Throughout our history we have experienced this, reason and heart say that our destiny is Europe". The plurality that is also the essence of modernity is therefore primarily peculiar to European civilization. Europe is also Christian, and John Paul II was right to insist on this root. Precisely in the awareness of this unity, the Pope proclaimed Cyril and Methodius, evangelizers of the Slavs, patrons of Europe,

placing them alongside St Benedict, to whom Paul VI had recognized the same attribute twenty-five years ago³⁶.

The rebuilding of Europe's historical unity was therefore at the heart of Andreotti's thinking. It was to be pursued gradually, in an absolutely peaceful and democratic manner and above all by lowering, as De Gasperi had recommended years earlier, the flag of nationalism, which was considered the main source of disintegration and conflict. In the prospect of unity and definitive democratic convergence between the "two Europe", hinted at by Andreotti in his Warsaw speech, the picture of the Austrian foreign minister, Alois Mock, and his Hungarian counterpart, Gyula Horn, cutting through the iron curtain which separated their two countries and which the fall of the Berlin Wall would shortly afterwards completely and definitively bring down, played a very important symbolic role.

This historical turning point took everyone by surprise, due to the unexpected speed with which it took place. The Italian concern, at that juncture, was to avoid an immediate domino effect beyond the Iron Curtain and an excessive weakening of Gorbačëv, even in the knowledge of an inevitable rearrangement of the European balance. Andreotti was convinced that the redefinition of the European balance would have to proceed by stages, without haste or dangerous leaps forward and above all in accordance with a multilateral logic. This is why the Italian government, along with France and United Kingdom, showed little liking for the proposal for an almost immediate German reunification, drawn up by Helmut Kohl (Varsori 2013). Rome, albeit without enthusiasm, could actually have given its green light to this solution, only if the timeframe for its implementation had been extended and if the German Chancellor had formally committed himself to accepting the Helsinki principles, the European borders and the internationalization, so to speak, of the entire reunification process. The birth of a new unified Germany should have taken place within the framework of a parallel and contextual process of political strengthening of the European Community and with the consent of NATO and CSCE.

In Andreotti's opinion, only the solid anchorage to a multilateral framework, within which Italy still had a certain weight, could have contained and neutralized the weight of the new German giant (Scarano 2017). On the contrary, Bonn considered that it had to deal only with the victorious powers of the Second World War as a priority, thus dealing a severe blow to Italy, whose demands were however partially satisfied on the occasion of the Dublin European Council, held in April 1990. At that meeting, without renouncing its

³⁶<http://digital.sturzo.it/archiviopersonale/andreotti/3241475/8> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

plan for rapid reunification, which was to become a reality as early as the beginning of October, the German government committed itself to accepting confrontation within the Atlantic Alliance and above all to supporting the project of political and economic strengthening of the EEC. This process culminated in fact in the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed on 7 February 1992 and created the European Union (Varsori 2013).

On the whole, Rome could be satisfied, because German reunification could in some way contribute to stabilizing the European balance and the international concert. It was all thanks to a «wise, realistic and far-sighted diplomacy», evoked by Andreotti in his Warsaw speech. It had proved capable of dealing with such a change, deactivating its potential disruptive power and making it an element of order and stability.

Saving Yugoslavia's integrity: the mission impossible of Italian government

With this same aim, the Italian government then tried to move in the much more complex Balkan scenario and also in the Danube area, attempting to assert the historical weight of a large and important geopolitical exposure in that quadrant. The mission was extremely difficult. Rome aimed to safeguard the institutional and political unity of Yugoslavia, neutralizing internal disintegrating pressures and stemming ethnic and religious-based nationalism, and to fill the gap between Western and Central-Eastern Europe, where the complex transition towards pluralism and full democracy was taking place. Rome wanted to create a zone of enhanced economic and political cooperation, destined, under Italian leadership, to become part of the European Community (Pirjevec 2002; Bucarelli 2004).

In this scenario, it is certainly not difficult to understand the importance given by Andreotti to the integrity of Yugoslavia, in its role of natural bridge between the Adriatic-Balkan and the Danubian-Carpathian areas. For the Italian government, the line set out on 1 October 1975 by the then Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, remained absolutely valid and topical, all the more so in the face of the ethnic tensions that had exploded in the country. Explaining the cornerstones of the Italian-Yugoslav agreement, soon to be signed in Osimo, to the Chamber of Deputies (Imperato-Monzali 2011; Monzali 2011; Monzali 2016), Moro said: «It is in Italy's essential interest that Yugoslavia be independent, intact and peaceful [...]. Fearsome reasons for contestation accumulate in the uncertainty and in an emotional climate»³⁷.

Fully in line with this approach, the Adriatic Initiative was launched by Italy in the autumn of 1989. This project was later opened also to Albania and

³⁷<https://www.camera.it/dati/leg06/lavori/stenografici/sed0401/sed0401.pdf> (accessed on 12 December 2020).

intended to stabilize the Balkan area (Varsori 2013; Varsori 2014). The so-called Quadrangular Agreement, signed in Budapest by Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria and Italy, was then conceived with another aim: to connect the Balkan region with the Danube area. This initiative would have contributed to strengthening the overall unity of Europe, by connecting East and West through the Mediterranean basin. At the Vienna summit, in May 1990, Czechoslovakia was to be added to this agreement, followed in 1991 by Poland, whose adhesion transformed its name into Hexagonal (Staffelmayer 1991).

In Andreotti's opinion, this was the right instrument to neutralize the Yugoslav crisis, or at least to contain its most devastating aspects. In fact, an emergency meeting of the Hexagonal was convened in Dubrovnik on 26-27 July 1991. It ended with the approval of an important document drawn up by the Italian government and shared by all the participants. While reaffirming full respect for the principle of self-determination and the autonomous instances expressed by the various Yugoslav republics, the representatives of the Hexagonal supported the option to keep alive a common federal bond, even if updated to the new complex situation (Varsori 2013; Varsori 2014).

But it was the dramatic outbreak of the war in Croatia that caused this Italian-led diplomatic initiative to fail. Precisely the war marked the point of no return for the integrity of Yugoslavia. The last desperate sorties of the Italian government in the autumn of 1991 proved to be in vain. Rome, in the end, had to take note of the overall dissolution of the federal republic conceived by Tito (Mastny 1995). On 19 and 23 December 1991 respectively, the Holy See and Germany announced in fact their intention to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. On 13 January 1992, anticipating all the EEC countries, the Holy See officially recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent and sovereign states³⁸. So Italy too had no choice but to recognize, according to the EEC decision, the two new republics, on 15 January 1992 (Bucarelli 2004; Varsori 2013; Varsori 2014).

Conclusions

That was, then, an act of great symbolic value. With it, Italy in fact signed its surrender to the new international order and took note above all of its painful downgrading in terms of geopolitical power relations (Romero 2018). Its centrality on the world chessboard was directly related to the survival of a European balance that, although it could no longer clearly correspond to the one decided at the end of the Second World War, due to the important transformations occurred in the former socialist countries, was too quickly upset by the simultaneous dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Their ethnic, political and institutional upheaval thus produced new structures, within

³⁸http://www.vatican.va/beatificazione_gp2/documents/pontificato_gp2_it.html#1992 (accessed on 12 December 2020).

which Italy would have had to completely rethink itself and its role, with the decisive contribution of the political parties and their cultural elaboration. But just as the Italian political system was preparing to face such a delicate challenge, it was overwhelmed by the Tangentopoli scandal³⁹, the populist campaigns against the parties and the end of the so-called First Republic (Varsori 2013). Solid political balances and consolidated institutional practices were then disrupted by the iconoclastic fury of self-styled innovators and the emergence of a new ruling class that, without the fundamental cultural contribution of the political parties, proved incapable of expressing an authentic national vision and of imagining a new international role for Italy, one that was truly worthy of its history.

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³⁹ This was the term used to describe the corrupt system, discovered during the nationwide judicial investigation called "Manipulite" (clean hands). It refers to Italian *tangente*, which means bribe given for [public works](#) contracts, and Greek *polis*, meaning city. This campaign, whose crucial figure was the public prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro, resulted in the demise of all the political parties of the so-called "[First Republic](#)".

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Polityka równowagi sił w Europie Giulio Andreottiego

*Giulio Andreotti to postać wyjątkowa w całej historii Republiki Włoskiej. Od roku 1946, kiedy zaczął pełnić funkcje publiczne, siedmiokrotnie sprawował urząd premiera, natomiast stanowisko ministerialne obejmował aż 32 razy. Kiedy zmarł w 2013 r. w wieku 94 lat, był uosobieniem władzy. Dzięki jego niezwyklej politycznej długowieczności i osiągniętym wpływom, postać jego przyciąga zainteresowanie opinii publicznej i badaczy. Świadczy o tym szereg opracowań historiograficznych, które ukazały się zwłaszcza po jego śmierci, a także produkcja filmowa *Il Divo* Paolo Sorrentiniego. Niedawna publikacja jego tajnych pamiętników, odnoszących się do dekady 1979-1989, rzuciła nowe światło na prawdziwe powołanie polityczne Andreottiego, jakim była dyplomacja. W opinii Andreottiego jest to niezbędne narzędzie rozwoju stabilnych stosunków międzynarodowych, utrwalenia geopolitycznej specyfiki Włoch, pozwalające jednocześnie na uwzględnienie interesów wielkich mocarstw, zachowanie lojalności atlantyckiej, a zwłaszcza utrzymanie równowagi sił w Europie. Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest zatem prześledzenie działań Andreottiego mających na celu obronę stabilności politycznej Europy, oraz analiza*

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charakterystycznych cech i inspirujących motywów prowadzonej przez niego "polityki równowagi".

Słowa kluczowe: Giulio Andreotti, Europa, równowaga sił, granice, żelazna kurtyna.