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THE CONCEPT OF PEACE AND VICTORY IN THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE[1]

KONCEPCJE POKOJU I ZWYCIĘSTWA W UKRAIŃSKIEJ POLITYCE WEWNĘTRZNEJ I ZAGRANICZNEJ

Abstract:

As a phenomenon of the 21st century, the Ukraine-Russia war challenges neo-liberal ideas about the loss of meaning of hard power and undermines claims that phenomena such as war no longer belong to contemporary international relations. On the contrary, it confirms the credibility of the neo-realist geopolitical paradigm.

The purpose of this article is to examine the concept of peace and victory, in the context of the ongoing war, in Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy practice. Therefore, the first part of the article is devoted to the conceptualization of war, peace and victory. The second part examines the importance of the concept of war as a foundation of Ukraine's domestic policy, which helps to understand the value of peace. The last part of the article presents an analysis of Ukraine's foreign policy, which presents predictive assessments of the advent of peace and its impact on regional and global security.

The optimistic prediction is that Europe will still find the strength to avoid the mistakes of the past, overcome its fear of Russia and make efforts to maintain the old post-bipolar order. Outlining the contours of a new international security system is only possible if Russia is defeated. If this does not happen, the unipolar peace will be replaced by a multipolar peace, and the new security system of Eastern Europe will be based on a regional arrangement capable of repelling threats both from the East and from other directions. The leading role in it, after victory over Russia, will most likely belong to Ukraine.

Keywords: neorealist paradigm, peace, regional and global security, Russian-Ukrainian war, victory, war.

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[1] The content of the article was presented and discussed during the Polish-Ukrainian Scientific Seminar entitled: *Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. Problems of security of the state, society and the region.* The seminar, under the patronage of the Consul of Ukraine, was held on January 19 this year at the Jagiellonian University on the initiative of the Polish Geopolitical Society. In its organization also participated University of Gdansk and Warsaw University.

Introduction

The Russian-Ukrainian war is not fully understood by politicians, analysts, political scientists, and even by historians. Its extraordinary importance lies in the fact that it provoked trends that go far beyond the borders of Ukraine itself. In this sense, the modern Russian aggression against Ukraine can be compared with the aggression of Germany in 1939 against Poland, which was just as insidious and treacherous. Obviously, it is possible to discuss certain parallels in the reaction of the Western allies to such treacherous aggression of Putin against Ukraine, as well as Hitler's against Poland. However, such comparative analysis is better left to historians. The task of political scientists is to determine the trends set by this Ukrainian-Russian war and its future consequences, both for Ukraine itself and for the regional and global security system.

The relevance of this scientific dissertation is determined by the need to study the Ukrainian-Russian war as a phenomenon of the 21st century, which destroys neo-liberal ideas about the loss of the meaning of hard power and the assertion that such phenomena as war do not belong to modern international relations, and vice versa - confirms the credibility of the neorealist paradigm. In this context, Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian war can act as a certain experimental or testing ground for checking the truth of neorealist concepts and predicting new conceptual models for building a regional and global security system. At least this question was already raised by the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky in his speech to the US Congress on December 22, 2022[2].

The object of the study are problems of domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine in the situation of war. Thus, a very urgent task is not only to highlight problems concerning national security of Ukraine and regional security in general, caused by Russian aggression, but also to determine the trends generated by this war, which is necessary for forecasting the future of Ukraine and the state of global and regional security.

Having chosen the neo-realist paradigm as a method of research, it is first necessary to recognize the significance of the war for Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies, as well as its impact on the security of both Ukraine itself and the international environment. Both the policies

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[2] https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/12/22/novyna/polityka/vystup-zelenskoho-konhresi-ssha-povnyj-tekst.

pursued and the security situation depend on the ways in which concepts such as "war" and "peace," "victory" and "defeat" are understood.

Peace and war, victory and defeat are interrelated categories. So their meaning can be defined through a certain dichotomy of peace and war, victory and defeat. Such a dichotomy conditions the meanings of war and peace, victory and defeat in their dialectical opposite, contradiction and interconnectedness not only from a formal-logical, but also an ontological point of view. According to these approaches, peace is qualified as the absence of war, and war as "not peace", that is, its absence. Ontologically, the results of many studies of such interdependence of peace and war have resulted in such a scientific direction as the theory of war and the theory of peace.

Conceptualization of war and peace in the Russian-Ukrainian war

The theories of political realism and neo-realism consider war as a certain state of relations between states, which is determined by their balance of power. "Peace", "war", "conflict" and "national interest" are considered central categories of political realism. In their foreign policy, states are guided by their own national interest, which creates anarchy in the system of international relations and generates conflicts. Therefore, the conflict becomes the main form of international relations, a manifestation of power politics and is a struggle for power, peace and national interest. According to this criterion, war is interpreted as a struggle for power, or for superiority in power. From the point of view of neo-realism, it is the balance of power that forms the structure of international relations. Thus, peace, like war, is a state of international relations. The only difference between them is that war is such a state in the conditions of the greatest tension of confrontation between states and the highest aggravation of their antagonistic interests, peace – on the contrary, is characterized by the absence of such signs in relations between states.

In principle, neo-realists argue that states make decisions in favor of war and peace depending on the balance of power and its changes in the structure of the system of international relations. Thus, John Mearsheimer, a proponent of Kenneth Waltz's structural realism, analyzed the structuring of power in international relations during the 1990s. In the famous article "*Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,*" (2001) he predicted the pessimistic future of Europe. According to the arguments of Mearsheimer, states start a war, being

convinced that war gives more advantages and achievements than risks and losses that arise in this case. These achievements and losses depend on two factors: the balance of power between states and the nature and properties of military power.

We find a different view of the role of force in international relations and the category of "peace" in the neo-liberal approaches presented, in particular, in the theory of democratic peace. Representatives of the neo-liberal school pay more attention to the research of the "peace" category. According to the theory of democratic peace, states with democratic regimes always prefer peace over war. The causes of wars unleashed by democratic countries can only be when they are aimed at achieving peace and freedom. In particular this theory focuses on the dependence of war or peace on the nature and type of existing regimes (Owen, 2001, p. 184). States with democratic regimes do not tend to fight each other, while authoritarian and totalitarian regimes prefer wars to achieve their goals and interests.

The second important postulate of neo-liberal theory is reduced to a structural understanding of the nature of power, where traditional military force is not considered dominant, because in the global world, states are becoming more interdependent, and therefore the victory in the war does not have the same value as the neo-realists claim (Copeland, 2001, p. 468). Therefore, in these conditions, the so-called "soft power" is more attractive in comparison with "hard power," which includes economic, diplomatic, energy, financial, humanitarian and other components (Nye, 2004). But then the question arises how to distinguish "war" from "peace", since these means of soft power are widely used in peacetime, both in the foreign and domestic policy of states. In this case, war is traditionally defined by the presence of not just hard power, but armed struggle, as a bilateral process of the use of military force. Thus, if we take this criterion of armed struggle as the basis for defining peace and war, then "war" is characterized by the presence of armed struggle between its subjects, and "peace" by its absence. Instead, in the doctrinal and conceptual documents of many countries, the armed struggle is indicated by the term "armed conflict", which goes beyond the concept of "war" and is rather considered an intermediate state between peace and war and, that is, a separate form of interaction not between states, but between their armed forces.

Therefore, over the past 30 years, studies of a conflictological nature have emerged as a separate scientific direction, the object of which is the category of "conflict", multilateral aspects of the causes of

international conflicts and the problems of their settlement, and related peacekeeping activities. Thus, the study of such categories as "war", "peace", "conflict" resulted in three scientific directions, which are represented in the theory of peace, the theory of war, the theory of conflict resolution and peacekeeping activities. At the same time, these directions are closely related to each other, since the relationship between the categories: "war", "peace", "conflict" is mutually determined (Harvey, Mor, eds., 1998). A conflict can exist even in the presence of peace at the stage of its latent development, when there is no use of military force between the conflicting parties. Such a state is called "cold peace", confrontational relations, or an international crisis. Therefore, both peace and war are part or stages of the process of conflict development, when the conflict from a state of peace passes into a state of war, and the war ends with peace, which in many cases means the end of the conflict.

At the same time, in the conditions of the 21st century, such an overlap led to the hybridization of peace and war, a new phenomenon that came to be called hybrid peace and hybrid war. That is why "hybrid peace" cannot be defined as a state of absence of war, since certain elements of war are present in it. This is peace in conditions of constant danger and the permanent threat of the use of weapons and violence. At the same time, "hybrid war" includes active combat operations, and armistice, and negotiations, and peacekeeping measures at various stages of conflict escalation. In this new form of war, Marcel H. van Herpen notes, *the demarcation line between peace and war has also become blurred. There is no declaration of war here, military actions immediately follow "peace negotiations" and "final truces", during which the hybrid war, albeit with a lower intensity, still continues* (Perepelytsia, 2021).

Such a blurring of the boundaries between hybrid war and hybrid peace, their beginning and end, caused the problem of defining and identifying the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas during 2014-2022, as well as the ways of its settlement. At the same time, the truce plays an important role in strengthening such blurring.

Armistice as an intermediate state between war and peace

Armistice is an intermediate state between war and peace and, at the same time, a connecting link between them. Therefore, it can serve both to return to peace and to increase the escalation of war. This is confirmed with incredible accuracy by the course of hostilities in Donbas

during 2014-2015 and the so-called "truce" in accordance with the Minsk agreements. On the other hand, in this way, the aggressor country can deny the very fact of war, which is what Russia actually did in this Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as Ukraine, but as a victim of aggression. Because of this, Russia avoided international responsibility for violating the peace and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian side considered the armistice as an opportunity and the main prerequisite for establishing a stable peace and ending the war. Therefore, for Ukraine, this was also the main condition for the implementation of the political part of the Minsk agreements. This justified the efforts of the Ukrainian leadership to resolve the conflict with Russia in the Donbas exclusively through political and diplomatic means, while avoiding the use of military force and the recognition of a state of war.

President V. Zelensky chose a similar path with the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine in the period from February to March 2022. The Ukrainian delegation believed that the condition for negotiations with Russia would be the failure of its Blitzkrieg, that is, Moscow would have to make concessions. Against this background, the Kremlin's demands for the end of the aggression also changed significantly. At first, they said that they would go to negotiations only after the Ukrainian servicemen lay down their arms. Then they put forward an ultimatum: neutral and non-nuclear status of Ukraine, demilitarization, "denazification", recognition of occupied Crimea and the so-called DPR and LPR.

President's office (OP) demanded the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the occupation contingent from Ukraine. But they immediately declared that there would be no surrender. The first round of negotiations took place on February 28, 2022 at the Belarusian border without preconditions. The main issues on the agenda of the negotiations were the cessation of shelling of civilian infrastructure and the return to the laws and customs of warfare[3]. But Moscow was not going to fulfill any of the promises.

The inconclusiveness of two rounds of negotiations led to the fact that President's office decided to organize a bilateral meeting between the President of Ukraine and the President of the Russian Federation. In response to persistent and unilateral attempts by the President of

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[3] https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/pozitsionnaya-voyna-stoit-peregovorami-ukrainy-1646452960.html.

Ukraine to meet face-to-face with Putin, Moscow declared that it was not the right time. However, despite this, Andriy Yermak's group in the OP decided to develop and implement a model of a peace agreement with Russia, which would be supported by much stronger security guarantees for Ukraine than even NATO membership.

Russia needed a truce only after the devastating defeats of Russian troops on the Russian-Ukrainian front by the Defense Forces of Ukraine during November-December 2022. The purpose of such a Russian truce remains unchanged - to get a certain pause in hostilities in order to mobilize 500,000 people in Russia, to replenish the troops that have suffered heavy losses and to start the next stage of the military campaign in Ukraine with new forces.

As for the views of the collective West represented by the USA and NATO, the positions of its members regarding the bilateral negotiation process to achieve peace between Ukraine and Russia differed radically. Proponents of a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and at the same time ardent opponents of Ukraine's membership in NATO, such as France and Germany, supported Ukraine's dialogue with Russia, believing that it would enable a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territories of Ukraine as soon as possible. Supporters of Ukraine's membership in NATO, in particular Britain and Poland, on the contrary, consider this approach counter-productive, that is, one that plays in Putin's favor. In addition, they were convinced that the Russian president does not consider the peace agreement seriously. The US Secretary of State E. Blinken shares the same opinion: he sees no signs that the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are "progressing in an effective way", since the US does not observe "real seriousness" on the part of the Russian Federation[4].

Turkey and China have their own separate position, which are trying to play the role of peacemakers and mediators in the negotiation process, while pursuing their own interests. Such a role gives them the opportunity to exert influence on Russia, Ukraine and the West at the same time, and thanks to this, receive certain geopolitical and material dividends.

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[4] https://mind.ua/news/20238751-blinken-ssha-ne-bachili-oznak-togo-shcho-rosiya-serjozno-vede-peregovori-z-ukrayinoyu.

The concept of victory as the goal of war and the way to peace

Another dimension of the Russian-Ukrainian war is defined and revealed through such a pair of categories as "victory" and "defeat". These two categories rather characterize the results of the war. In the _neo-realist conception_, these categories are formulated as a "zero-sum" game, where the winner takes everything and the loser loses everything and suffers complete or partial collapse. Thus, the desire for victory becomes the main task of war, as well as the task of avoiding defeat. Two main types of combat are built on these tasks: offensive and defensive. Therefore, the concept of victory belongs to the central categories of neo-realism, which explains the process of radical change in the system of international relations and geopolitical shifts in the world.

Neo-liberal theories claim that in the modern world victory no longer has the same value as in the past, since traditional military power is no longer considered dominant, and therefore the balance of power in its military sense cannot be considered an influential factor in foreign policy. More important from this neo-liberal point of view is not the gains of victory, but its price and the cost of war itself. Such a discourse poses before us questions of an ontological nature: what is the meaning of victory, in particular for Ukraine; what will be the consequences of Ukraine's victory in domestic and foreign politics? Does Ukraine have enough resources to defeat Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian war?

The ontological meaning of victory is revealed when comparing it with the categories of "war" and "peace". In their relationship, victory is a guarantee of peace and the shortest path to its achievement, which significantly reduces the costs incurred as a result of its achievement, and thus increases the value of victory and its acquisition. That is why victory is the goal of the warring parties in any war, because it gives the opportunity to get the greatest dividends from that war. Although such dependence is determined by a certain type of war, or a separate phase of it. In this ontological sense, victory means the achievement of complete superiority, triumph, or the achievement of political goals in the face of opposition, as well as strategic success in war, or the achievement of significant results. Hence, the magnitude of the victory can be determined by the achievement of the final (ultimate), intermediate, real or declarative goal.

Victory, like defeat, has different dimensions: diplomatic, military and others. The criteria for a military victory include: inflicting a complete military defeat on the enemy, defeating the group of armed forces and destroying its military potential, winning the strategic

initiative in the theater of war, seizing an advantageous military-strategic position or strategic advantage over the enemy. A political victory is considered to be: the realization of territorial encroachments, the establishment of full control over the conquered territories, the destruction of the state sovereignty of the enemy country or, on the contrary, the restoration of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Did Putin achieve the main political goals in the war, which would give reason to talk about the victory of Russia over Ukraine, which consisted in the complete destruction of its state sovereignty and territorial integrity and Ukrainians as a nation? These goals were declared in the slogan "denazification", which means the physical destruction of Ukrainians and "demilitarization". The last slogan meant inflicting a complete defeat on the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

The military defeat of Russia during 2022 forced it to limit its intermediate goals, reducing their scale of occupation and annexing to the Russian Federation only part of the Ukrainian territory within the borders of the Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhia regions, that is, to reduce not only the length of the front line, but also the scale of victory. However, the ultimate final goals turned out to be unattainable for Putin, which is why Russia did not achieve victory in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and must continue it, increasing its mobilization resources for this purpose.

Therefore, for Russia, the price of victory is not so important, since it does not count with its losses and resources. For Ukraine, the cost of the war is very high, as it suffers huge devastating losses to its economy, infrastructure, bears huge demographic, economic and social losses, which can be calculated only after the end of this war.

However, the course of the war changes the meaning of the victory itself. What was considered the victory of Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian war in the format of a hybrid war with its transition into a large-scale phase? At the beginning of the large-scale military invasion of Russia, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory before the start of their invasion on February 24, 2022 was considered a victory for Ukraine. With the failure of the Russian blitzkrieg near Kyiv, the criterion for Ukrainian victory became the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which existed at the time of 1991, and the liberation of Ukrainian territories, including Crimea and Donbas, which were occupied in 2014. Now, the criteria for Ukraine's victory in the war with Russia have become the 10 points laid out in V. Zelenskyi's Peace Formula, which include Russia's complete capitulation stipulated in the

peace treaty and the payment of reparations and all damages caused to the Russian Federation in this war. The complete victory of Ukraine, which will provide it with peace, stability and security, can only be the liquidation of the Russian Federation as an imperial state and its degradation and complete collapse.

Today, the victory of Ukraine in the Russo-Ukrainian war will mean the resolution of the existential conflict of identity with Russia, which has lasted for more than 300 years.

The inner dimension of victory

The victory also has an internal social dimension, which is determined by the consolidation and stability of Ukrainian society. In terms of faith in the victory of Ukraine, the morale of Ukrainians is high. According to the survey data published by the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation "Democratic Initiatives" from December 13 to 21, 2022, 93% of Ukrainians believe in the victory of Ukraine in the war. Only 3% of respondents doubted the victory. This is an important question that shows the margin of safety for the near term. Citizens' answers also showed a high level of optimism and hope. More than half of the citizens consider the expulsion of Russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine, including the Crimea, to be a victory. Another 20.4% consider the destruction of the Russian army and the promotion of the uprising/collapse of Russia as a victory. At the same time, 40% of those surveyed are confident that victory will be achieved by the summer of 2023. 22% bet on victory in 1-2 years, and another 20% believe that victory can be achieved in the coming months. The absolute majority (54%) of Ukrainians see victory in the expulsion of Russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and the restoration of borders as of January 2014. Another 22% believe that this cannot be stopped and that it is necessary to achieve the complete destruction of the Russian army and the disintegration of the Russian Federation from within[5]. 18% of respondents are ready to give up certain parts of the occupied territories in exchange for the cessation of hostilities and consider it a victory. Of these, 8% are ready to cede only Crimea, 6% - territories occupied until February 23, 2022, and 3% - all territories currently occupied by the Russian army.

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[5] https://www.unian.ua/society/ukrajinci-vidpovili-yak-bachat-peremogu-u-viyni-z-rosiyeyu-opituvannya-12094545.html.

Only 7% of the population of the western and southern regions of Ukraine are ready to end the war, even if the Russian army holds on to the territories occupied after February 24, 2022. The absolute majority of Ukrainians believe that the country's military and political leadership should continue the war even if aid from Western countries decreases or stops completely. 15% believe that under such conditions it would be better to try to freeze the conflict, but not to accept the conditions of the Russian Federation[6].

At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian war has enormous both destructive and constructive consequences for Ukraine. In the internal dimension, this _destructive influence_ is manifested in the loss of resources, territory, part of sovereignty, the destruction of its economic potential, labor resources, social, transport and industrial infrastructure. Thus, as a result of the offensive, Russian troops occupied 21% of Ukrainian territory over which Ukraine lost its state sovereignty.

During eight months of waging a large-scale war in 2022, Ukraine suffered huge demographic losses. Losses in human resources in the Russian-Ukrainian war should be divided into combat and demographic losses among the civilian population. The losses of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) during this time, according to recognition, amounted to 13000 dead[7]. Demographic losses are calculated: the number of dead, wounded, refugees, displaced persons and disappeared, as well as interned. According to this last indicator, Ukraine suffered losses comparable to its losses during the Second World War. According to official statistics compiled by the UN, the loss of civilians in Ukraine from the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion to November 20, 2022 exceeds 16,700 people killed and wounded. This list includes 6,595 dead and 10,189 wounded civilians, including children, both in the areas that remain under the occupation of Russian forces and in the territory controlled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Ukraine suffered even greater losses as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its occupation of parts of the Donbas territory, where 2.2 million and 3 million people remained. And about 1,200,000 people still remain in Ukraine, who remained in the occupied territories of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Thus, during this period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, 6.8 million Ukrainian citizens were interned by

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[6] https://dif.org.ua/article/pidsumki-2022-pid-sino-zhovtim-praporom-svobodi
[7] https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/12/01/novyna/polityka/zelenskoho-nazvaly-vtraty-ukrayinskoyi-armiyi-vijni-proty-rf

Russia, as Ukraine declared these territories occupied by Russian troops. According to the UN, the number of refugees from Ukraine exceeded 6.5 million people, of which more than 3.5 million people were sheltered by Poland. The number of internally displaced persons was 8 million[8].

Since the war is being fought on the territory of Ukraine, it has suffered the greatest direct and indirect material and economic losses not only due to economic exhaustion, but primarily due to the occupation by Russian troops of Crimea, Luhansk and part of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions. As a result of hostilities on the territory of these regions, the heavy mining and machine-building industries were significantly affected. As of the beginning of 2023, Ukraine's losses due to Russian aggression amount to more than 700 billion dollars. Compared to June 2022, the amount has doubled.

The fall in Ukraine's GDP as a result of the war in 2022 is estimated at the level of 30.4%[9]. As of 2022, at least 109 large and medium-sized enterprises have suffered direct losses as a result of a full-scale intrusion. The total amount of direct losses of enterprises is estimated at $13 billion. Of them, $9 billion is the share of losses of large and medium-sized enterprises. Total indirect losses reach $33.1 billion[10].

The government said that at the beginning of December, the aggressor managed to completely destroy and significantly damage about 50% of the critical electric power infrastructure in the amount of $6.8 billion. Direct losses of the housing stock increased by $2 billion and now amount to $52.5 billion. In the total amount of losses, this is more thirds – 38.6%. In more than 9 months of war, the Russian occupiers destroyed and damaged 143,800 residential buildings[11]. Damage to the Ukrainian environment from the war exceeded $38 billion[12].

Along with the losses, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship also contributed to a _constructive_ shift in Ukraine, including: the destruction of the existing oligarchic-kleptocratic political system, the renewal of the national political elite, the strengthening of the Ukrainian national identity, the reform of the Armed Forces and the renewal of all spheres

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[8] https://finbalance.com.ua/news/oon-z-ukrani-pid-chas-viyni-vikhali-65-mln-osib-vnutrishnikh-pereselentsiv---8-mln

[9] https://tsn.ua/groshi/naybilshi-vtrati-za-vsyu-istoriyu-nezalezhnosti-na-skilki-vpav-vvp-ukrayini-2022-roku-2237680.html

[10] https://kse.ua/ua/about-the-school/news/zbitki-zavdani-ukrayinskomu-biznesu-vnaslidok-rosiyskoyi-agresiyi-otsinyuyutsya-v-13-mlrd/

[11] https://kse.ua/ua/about-the-school/news/na-listopad-2022-roku-zagalna-suma-zbitkiv-zavdana-infrastrukturi-ukrayini-skladaye-mayzhe-136-mlrd/.

[12] https://lb.ua/society/2022/12/09/538529_zbitki_ukrainskomu_dovkillyu_vid.html

of Ukraine's development, the irreversible choice of a civilizational and geopolitical vector, which means the movement of Ukraine to NATO and the EU.[13]

Foreign policy dimension

The Russian-Ukrainian war has enormous both destructive and constructive international consequences. The *destructive international consequences* of the Russian war against Ukraine are as follows.

1. As a result of Russian military aggression, the global balance of power turned out to be disturbed, putting on the agenda the beginning of the escalation of confrontation for a new redistribution of spheres of influence in the world. The Russian-Ukrainian war started this process. A process that no one can stop, when the old security structures have turned out to be helpless, and the United States is not yet able to give an adequate response to Russia's aggressiveness and stop the tsunami of threatening global and regional instability.

2. Russia's violation of international norms and rules created a precedent for violating the existing world order. Looking at this, the candidate countries for the status of world and regional power will no longer count with these norms of behavior and will rely only on force to achieve their ambitious goals.

3. Of course, the world community, first of all, the United States and Europe do not want to believe in such a perspective and are trying to preserve the post-bipolar world order, forcing and persuading Russia to return to a "strategic partnership" with the West. This further convinces the Kremlin of the latter's "weakness" and strengthens Russia's desire to change the balance of power in its favor, or even oppose the West in its sphere of influence by shaking its power.

The *constructive international consequences* of this war include:

1. Collapse of the existing geopolitical axis: Paris – Berlin – Moscow – Beijing.

2. The destruction of the existing World order, which leads to the weakening of the USA and NATO and the emergence of a new World-system of international relations.

3. The weakening of Russia, which leads to its gradual collapse.

4. Discrediting the existing structures of international security and international law.

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[13] Weaknesses of the Ukrainian state, society and economy about 2017 were highlighted by Wilczyński (2018).

5. A test of the viability of Western civilization in the conditions of the collapse of liberal ideology.

6. Militarization of the economy.

7. Global change in the balance of power and balance of interests.

8. New geopolitical restructuring and emergence of new geopolitical players, including Ukraine!

9. Strengthening the international subjectivity of Ukraine, which will set new international trends.

10. The leading role of Ukraine in the formation of a new security complex in Europe.

11. Formation of a new security architecture in the Central and Eastern Europe, which will be determined by the winning countries (Ukraine + Poland + Great Britain + "Ramstein").

Conclusions

1. Any war sooner or later ends in peace. The Russian-Ukrainian war is no exception. The only question is: when will this peace come, on whose terms and with what result? But, if Europe does not realize that the new architecture of European and international security will be formed by the winners of this war, as well as those who joined them in time and became contributors to this victory, it will again reap the consequences of the mistakes of 1938, but then it must be ready get the same as during the Second World War. However, now with nuclear weapons in addition.

2. Therefore, the optimistic forecast is that Europe will still find the strength to avoid the mistakes of the past, overcome the fear of Russia and efforts to preserve the status quo of the old post-bipolar order. After all, the contours of the new system of international security are possible only if Russia is defeated. Ukraine does not need guarantees from the UN or NATO, which do not play a significant role in this war, but a new security system in which these organizations will obviously be marginal. The victory of Ukraine in the Russo-Ukrainian war will mean the resolution of the existential conflict of identity with Russia, which has lasted for more than 300 years.

3. Unipolar peace will be replaced by multipolar peace. Therefore, the new configuration of this security system in the Central and Eastern Europe should be determined by a regional security complex capable of resisting threats both from the East and from other directions. The leading role in it after the victory over Russia will most likely belong to Ukraine.

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Streszczenie:

Jako fenomen XXI wieku, wojna ukraińsko-rosyjska rzuca wyzwanie neoliberalnym ideom o utracie znaczenia *hard power* i podważa twierdzenia, że zjawiska takie jak wojna nie należą już do współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych. Wręcz przeciwnie, potwierdza wiarygodność neorealistycznego paradygmatu geopolitycznego.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zbadanie koncepcji pokoju i zwycięstwa, w kontekście trwającej wojny, w praktyce polityki wewnętrznej i zagranicznej Ukrainy. Dlatego pierwsza część artykułu poświęcona jest konceptualizacji wojny, pokoju i zwycięstwa. W drugiej części zbadano znaczenie koncepcji wojny jako fundamentu polityki wewnętrznej Ukrainy, która pomaga zrozumieć wartość pokoju. W ostatniej części artykułu przedstawiono analizę polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy, w której zaprezentowano predykcyjne oceny nadejścia pokoju i jego wpływu na bezpieczeństwo regionalne i globalne.

Optymistyczna prognoza zakłada, że Europa znajdzie jeszcze siłę, by uniknąć błędów przeszłości, przezwyciężyć strach przed Rosją i podjąć wysiłki na rzecz utrzymania starego, post-bipolarnego porządku. Nakreślenie konturów nowego systemu bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego jest możliwe tylko wtedy, gdy Rosja zostanie pokonana. Jeśli tak się nie stanie, jednobiegunowy pokój zostanie zastąpiony wielobiegunowym, a nowy system bezpieczeństwa Europy Wschodniej będzie oparty na układzie regionalnym zdolnym do odparcia zagrożeń zarówno ze Wschodu, jak i z innych kierunków. Wiodąca rola w nim, po zwycięstwie nad Rosją, będzie najprawdopodobniej należała do Ukrainy.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo regionalne i globalne, paradygmat neorealistyczny, pokój, wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska, wojna, zwycięstwo.